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REVIEW
Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It?
Peter Decherney,† Nathan Ensmenger,†† & Christopher S. Yoo‡
The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires
Tim Wu. Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. Pp x, 366.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become such an integral part of people’s daily
lives that one can easily forget how young it is. After a two-decade
gestation period, during which the network was primarily the
plaything of university-based computer scientists, the Internet
exploded onto the public’s consciousness during the mid-1990s.
During this period, the Internet was widely regarded as unlike
1
anything that had ever gone before. Every month seemed to bear
witness to a new innovation that made possible new forms of
expression and communication. The Internet’s potential seemed
2
limitless.
In recent years, the heady days of the Internet’s youth have given
way to the more troubled days of its adolescence. Commentators have
begun to bemoan the ways in which the Internet may actually be
3
damaging the human condition. Other writers are more sanguine
† Associate Professor of Cinema Studies and English, University of Pennsylvania.
†† Assistant Professor, School of Information, University of Texas.
‡ John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information
Science and Founding Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition,
University of Pennsylvania. The authors would like to thank Joe Turow for his contributions
during initial discussions about this Review.
1
For a leading statement of Internet exceptionalism, see David R. Johnson and David
Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1367, 1387–91 (1996). For
a somewhat polemical statement of this position, see John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace (Feb 8, 1996), online at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/DeclarationFinal.html (visited Apr 27, 2011).
2
See George Gilder, Telecosm: How Infinite Bandwidth Will Revolutionize Our World 10–11
(Free Press 2000).
3
See, for example, Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our
Brains 190–92 (W.W. Norton 2010); Jaron Lanier, You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto 20 (Knopf
2010); William Powers, Hamlet’s BlackBerry: A Practical Philosophy for Building a Good Life in
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about the Internet’s past but harbor concerns about its future. In
particular, these authors warn that corporate actors are threatening to
change the Internet’s fundamental character in ways that will
4
ultimately harm end users.
Tim Wu has written an important new book in this latter
tradition. In The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information
Empires, Wu scrutinizes the history of four of our nation’s leading
communications technologies and identifies a disturbing pattern that
he calls “the Cycle.” New technologies emerge swathed in the spirit of
5
“revolutionary novelty and youthful utopianism” (p 6). Over time,
consumers become dissatisfied with the quality or reliability of the
new technology, and incumbents become concerned with the threat
that the new technology poses to existing revenue streams (p 10). This
in turn opens the door for a great mogul (often with the assistance of
the federal government) to take control of the industry and make sure
that it runs in an orderly fashion, which ushers in “a golden age in the
life of the new technology” (p 10). In the process, the control asserted
by this mogul transforms the technology “from a freely accessible
channel to one strictly controlled by a single corporation or cartel—
from open to closed system”—until some new form of ingenuity starts
the Cycle anew (p 6).
The book offers much to admire. Wu builds his narrative around
some of the leading figures in the history of technology, an approach
that fits well with Wu’s natural flair for storytelling. But perhaps the
most compelling aspect of the book is the sheer scope of its argument.
Attempting to find a single overarching pattern in industries as
disparate as telephony, broadcasting, motion pictures, and computers
is ambitious. If successful, identifying a single cycle that accurately
describes how communications technologies and business practices
change over time would give policymakers (and the policy advocates
attempting to persuade them) the kind of clear policy inference

the Digital Age 1–4 (HarperCollins 2010); John Freeman, The Tyranny of E-mail: The FourThousand-Year Journey to Your Inbox 5–6 (Scribner 2009); Lee Siegel, Against the Machine:
Being Human in the Age of the Electronic Mob 5–6 (Spiegel & Grau 2008); Andrew Keen, The
Cult of the Amateur: How Today’s Internet Is Killing Our Culture 9 (Doubleday 2007); Cass R.
Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 11–18 (Princeton 2007).
4
See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a
Connected World 40–48 (Random House 2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of
Everything (and Why We Should Worry) 11–12 (California 2010); Barbara van Schewick, Internet
Architecture and Innovation 372 (MIT 2010); Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—and
How to Stop It 178–85 (Yale 2008).
5
“Every few decades a new communications technology appears, bright with promise and
possibility. It inspires a generation to dream of a better society, new forms of expression,
alternative types of journalism” (p 10).
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needed to justify the type of categorical intervention that Wu
proposes.
But expanding a theory’s scope can be a double-edged sword.
While breadth of application heightens a theory’s analytical power, it
simultaneously makes it harder to frame a theory that is consistent
with the underlying facts. Devising a theory that accurately describes
the considerations driving the evolution of a single industry is difficult
enough. Developing a theory that takes into account all of the
essential characteristics and idiosyncrasies of multiple industries
simultaneously makes the challenge even harder. The more general
the theory, the more difficult this problem becomes.
The success of The Master Switch thus depends on the extent to
which the histories of the industries on which Wu focuses actually fit
the pattern he has identified. The first four Parts of this Review take
each of Wu’s key industries in turn and critically examine the
historical instances the book discusses as well as the portions of the
historical record that are not mentioned. Part V discusses the broader
theoretical literature exploring some of the nuances lost by attempting
to draw a single conclusion that spans all four of these industries. We
recognize that Wu’s book is aimed at a popular rather than a scholarly
audience, and we applaud Wu’s attempt to identify patterns in the
manner in which different technology-oriented industries evolve.
Nonetheless, a close examination of the historical episodes that serve
as the foundation for Wu’s argument suggests that the Cycle Wu has
identified represents just one of many possible cycles. A more
complex vision of the mechanisms driving these cycles would yield
new insights into which policy levers to pull and when.
I. TELEPHONE
Wu traces the telephone industry through what he sees as three
distinct turns of the Cycle. Although Wu’s arguments invite readers to
regard all three as examples of the same phenomenon, closer
inspection reveals that each episode reflects a different definition of
openness, a different vision of the mechanism by which an industry
becomes open or closed, and a more complex picture of how the
federal government influences the way technology evolves.
A. The Rise and Fall of Independent Telephony
The first turn of the Cycle began with the rise of Bell’s relatively
small, regional competitors—to whom Wu refers as “Independents”—
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6

following the expiration of the initial Bell patents in 1894. Often
overlooked, this important era was largely the result of a mistake in
business strategy by the Bell System. Patterning itself after the
telegraph system, the telephone system focused on establishing longdistance connections between large financial centers and ignored rural
areas, smaller metropolitan areas, and even suburban areas around
7
cities. Under this vision, the telephone was exclusively an instrument
of commerce. Early Bell System executives never envisioned the
extent to which people would want telephones in their own homes for
8
purely social reasons.
Bell’s strategy created a skeletal network that left wide stretches
of virgin territory within which the Independents could operate freely.
This led to what Wu regards as the first great era of openness in the
telephone industry. The low entry costs allowed local telephone
companies competing directly with the Bell System to flourish (p 46).
In 1907 and 1908, the Independents had captured more than 50
9
percent of the national market.
Wu regards the Independents as being infused with a different
ethos than Bell in that they saw the telephone as cheaper, more
6
See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the
Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 Colum L Rev 1822, 1892–96 (2007); Daniel F. Spulber
and Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Systems, 61 Fed
Comm L J 43, 63–65 (2008). Wu actually begins his narrative with a prologue reviewing the
telephone industry’s initial struggle to displace the telegraph industry. According to Wu, Western
Union, like the Greek Titan Kronos, attempted to thwart the emergence of potential successors
by consuming them (p 25). If so, Western Union’s initial imitation of Kronos was very poor: as
Wu mentions in passing, Western Union declined an offer to purchase the Bell telephone patents
for $100,000 (p 31). (Ironically, Western Union would later offer 250 times that amount, only to
be rebuffed and ultimately absorbed by the Bell System, instead of the other way around.)
Western Union’s attempt to defend its turf was ultimately frustrated not by the Theodore Vail–
type mogul envisioned by Wu’s theory but rather by patent litigation and an auspiciously timed
assault on Western Union courtesy of financier Jay Gould. Moreover, the fall of Western Union
was not followed by the expected generation of dreamers experimenting with ways that the new
technology might transform society (pp 6, 10). Instead, it was the displacement of one closed
system by another closed system that was itself roundly criticized for its lack of innovation and
penchant for control.
7
Milton L. Mueller Jr, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in
the Making of the American Telephone System 39–42, 55, 59 (MIT 1997); David F. Weiman and Richard
C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894–1912, 102 J Pol
Econ 103, 106–07 (1994).
8
See Mueller, Universal Service at 77–78 (cited in note 7).
9
See US Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970
part 2 at 783 (GPO Bicentennial ed 1975) (reporting a total of 3.1 million Independent
telephones and 3.0 million Bell telephones in 1907 and a total of 3.3 million Independent
telephones and 3.2 million Bell telephones in 1908). See also Robert Bornholz and David S.
Evans, The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry, in David S. Evans, ed,
Breaking Up Bell: Essays on Industrial Organization and Regulation 7, 13 (North-Holland 1983);
Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communications, 1893–1920, 34 L &
Contemp Probs 340, 344 (1969).
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common, less commercial, and more open (pp 46–47). Although
associating the Independents with such values fits nicely into his
narrative, doing so elides an important distinction within the
Independent movement. One part of the movement was composed of
cooperatives established by farmers in largely rural areas that
10
reflected the values that Wu suggests. The more established wing of
the Independent movement, however, consisted of firms backed by
successful merchants, bankers, and business leaders who were much
more conservative, less driven by a political and social agenda, and
11
primarily interested in profit. This latter group of Independents
sought not a world of open interconnection but rather one in which
12
they emerged as the new monopolists. They stridently opposed
13
government regulations mandating interconnection. Indeed, in most
things, their values were not so different from Bell’s. In addition, these
two groups’ attitudes toward the Bell System diverged widely. The
more commercially oriented Independents’ desire to destroy and
14
replace Bell brooked no compromise. The rural cooperatives, in
contrast, were simply interested in bringing service to their areas as
quickly and cheaply as possible. As a result, they were much more
willing to compromise with Bell and were even willing to enter into
15
direct competition with other Independents.
Wu does a service in calling attention to the rural cooperatives,
which have long been deemphasized by histories of the Independent
telephone industry. It would be a mistake, however, to replace an
exclusive focus on one subgroup of Independents with an exclusive
focus on the other. Although some would engage in a search for which
of these constituencies represented the true Independents, the data
suggest that the Independent movement enjoyed its greatest success
16
where both wings offered their political support. Although this more
complex perspective does not fit as smoothly with Wu’s narrative, it
does provide a more nuanced appreciation for the dynamics of
innovation and industrial change.

10 See Robert MacDougall, The People’s Telephone: The Political Culture of Independent
Telephony, 1894–1913, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line 4–5 (2003), online at http://www.thebhc.org
/publications/BEHonline/2003/MacDougall.pdf (visited Jun 2, 2011).
11 See id at 5–6, 10.
12 See Gabel, 34 L & Contemp Probs at 354 (cited in note 9) (“The successful competitor
strives to become the surviving monopolist.”).
13 See Mueller, Universal Service at 10, 51, 78–79 (cited in note 7); Bornholz and Evans,
Early History of Competition at 26–27 (cited in note 9); Gabel, 34 Law & Contemp Probs
at 353–54 (cited in note 9).
14 See Mueller, Universal Service at 78–79 (cited in note 7).
15 See id at 69.
16 See MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 5, 8 (cited in note 10).
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The bigger question is what caused this burgeoning Independent
movement to fade and allowed the industry to collapse back into
17
monopoly. In accordance with a long historical tradition, Wu suggests
that the Independents were undone by their inability to create their
own long-haul long-distance network (p 53). Historians have begun to
question this explanation, however. In sharp contrast to telegraphy, the
18
vast majority of telephone traffic was local. The long-distance traffic
19
that existed tended to travel no more than fifty to one-hundred miles.
In such a world, long-haul long-distance was “of little commercial or
20
social importance.” Moreover, with respect to short-haul long distance,
Bell and the Independents employed the same technology, so neither
21
side had a cost or quality advantage. What mattered was not the total
number of telephone subscribers nationwide or the ability to contact
distant money centers, but rather the density of connections within a
22
particular city or at most within a region. For example, residents of
Muncie, Indiana, who subscribed to Bell could call Chicago, New York,
or Boston. Or they could instead subscribe to the Independent, which
would allow them to reach neighboring cities located some ten and
23
twenty miles away. The Independents’ regional dominance in the

17 See John V. Langdale, The Growth of Long-Distance Telephony in the Bell System: 1876–1907,
4 J Hist Geo 145, 155 (1978). See also Weiman and Levin, 102 J Pol Econ at 115–17 (cited in note 7).
18 See MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 13 & n 46 (cited in note 10) (reporting
statements by two Independents that 97 percent and 98 percent of all telephone calls were local).
19 See Mueller, Universal Service at 72–73 & n 50 (cited in note 7) (reporting an AT&T
graph showing that 98 percent of all calls from cities and 95 percent of calls from small towns
were placed to points located within fifty miles); MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 13
n 46 (cited in note 10) (reporting a statement by an Independent that 98 percent of all longdistance calls were placed to points within an one-hundred mile radius). See also Smith v Illinois
Bell Telephone Co, 282 US 133, 147 (1930) (reporting that interstate calls constituted less than
0.5 percent of all telephone traffic); Hearings on S 6 before the Committee on Interstate
Commerce, Commission on Communications, 71st Cong, 2d Sess 1565, 1585–86 (1930)
(statement of Joseph B. Eastman, Commissioner, Interstate Commerce Commission) (reporting
that interstate traffic represented 0.47 percent of all exchange calls and 0.46 percent of total
exchange revenue and that if exchange and toll calls were combined, intrastate traffic
represented 1.36 percent of all calls and 9.9 percent of revenue); MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist
On-Line at 12–13 (cited in note 10).
20 Mueller, Universal Service at 73 (cite in note 7).
21 See id at 72.
22 See id at 59, 72; Bornholz and Evans, Early History of Competition at 28 (cited in
note 9). Were dominance a function of national subscribership, the Independents could have
nullified whatever advantage the Bell System may have enjoyed by forming a network of equal
size simply by agreeing to interconnect with one another. Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen,
The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in John E. Kwoka Jr and
Lawrence J. White, eds, The Antitrust Revolution 290, 292 (Scott, Foresman 1989).
23 See MacDougall, 1 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line at 11–12 (cited in note 10) (quoting the
president of Cleveland’s independent Cuyahoga Telephone Company as saying, “The Cuyahoga
has the near long distance points, the Bell [has] the far-off”).
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Midwest meant that in those areas they and not Bell enjoyed the
strategic benefits of being the incumbent.
Wu offers an alternative explanation, attributing industry
reconsolidation to the corporate depredations of AT&T President
Theodore Vail, backed by the financial power of J.P. Morgan. These
moguls abandoned the Bell System’s initial policy of trying to drive
the Independents out of business and instead simply merged into a
24
monopoly by offering to buy the Independents out (pp 49–50, 52).
According to this account, the antitrust authorities offered only token
opposition, allowing the modest concessions embodied in the 1913
Kingsbury Commitment to justify permitting the Bell System to keep
its recently acquired companies (pp 55–56). Wu regards the Kingsbury
Commitment as sanctioning monopoly, with the ultimate coup de
25
grâce coming with the enactment of the Willis-Graham Act in 1921
(p 59). Other commentators have similarly criticized the antitrust
authorities for interpreting the Kingsbury Commitment to permit the
Bell System to continue to acquire Independent telephone companies
26
so long as it sold an equivalent number of lines to an Independent.
The only silver lining to the Kingsbury Commitment, according to Wu,
was Vail’s acceptance of common-carriage regulation (p 57), and even
27
that claim appears to be suspect.
If true, this would represent a pattern somewhat consistent with
the Cycle. A close review of the historical record reveals that, contrary
to what some scholars suggest, the Bell System had not yet come close
to reestablishing a monopoly at the time of the Kingsbury

24 See AT&T, Annual Report 21 (1910) (“Wherever it could be legally done, and done with
the acquiescence of the public, opposition companies have been acquired and merged into the
Bell System.”).
25 42 Stat 27, repealed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104
§ 601(b)(2), 110 Stat 56, 143.
26 See, for example, Gerald W. Brock, The Telecommunications Industry 155–56 (Harvard
1981); Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Politics of Telecommunications Regulation: The States and the
Divestiture of AT&T 48 (M.E. Sharpe 1992); Mueller, Universal Service at 134 (cited in note 7).
27 A general common-carriage obligation would typically involve regulating retail rates
and the duty to serve all retail subscribers. The Kingsbury Commitment, however, did not
address retail service in any way. Instead of focusing on retail subscribers, the Kingsbury
Commitment provided the Independents access to the Bell System’s long-distance network.
Moreover, the Commitment was not reciprocal: promising to allow the Independent companies’
subscribers to contact Bell System subscribers through the Bell long-distance network did not
obligate the Bell System to provide its subscribers with access to Independent telephone
companies’ customers in return. Mueller, Universal Service at 132 (cited in note 7). These
considerations make it hard to portray the Kingsbury Commitment as the type of mandatory
interconnection that represents the core of Wu’s policy recommendations. To the extent that
common carriage was forthcoming, it was from the newly formed state public-utility
commissions who had jurisdiction over local telephone service and not federal antitrust
authorities whose purview was limited to interstate commerce. See id at 132–35.

The University of Chicago Law Review

1634

[78:1627

Commitment; indeed, Independents still controlled 45 percent of the
28
national market. The issue, then, is not the status of the Bell System
at the time of the Kingsbury Commitment but rather what happened
afterwards. Again, the historical record is more complex than
generally known. Although many scholars evaluating the Kingsbury
Commitment’s efficacy have focused on whether the number of
Independent lines acquired from Bell exceeded the number of Bell
29
lines acquired by the Independents, a more telling measure might be
the Commitment’s impact on the absolute number of lines that Bell
purchased from the Independents. As shown in Figure 1, the number
of total Bell acquisitions plummeted after 1913, suggesting that the
Kingsbury Commitment was not as toothless in curbing further Bell
takeovers of Independent telephone systems as some would suggest.
It was not until 1917 that the pattern of acquisitions would resume,
which was when the de facto requirement that the Bell System sell as
many lines as it acquired discussed above actually emerged.
FIGURE 1. TELEPHONE LINES ACQUIRED BY THE BELL SYSTEM,
1912–1921
175,000
150,000
125,000
100,000
75,000
50,000
25,000
0
1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Source: Federal Communications Commission, 3 Report on Control of Telephone Communications:
Control of Independent Telephone Companies 42 table v (June 15, 1937).

28 See US Census Bureau, Historical Statistics part 2 at 783 table R 1–12 (cited in note 9)
(indicating that the Independents still controlled 4.288 million of 9.543 million total telephone lines).
29 See Richard H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in
America 172 (Belknap 1994); Gabel, 34 L & Contemp Probs at 353 (cited in note 9).
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The true determinant of Bell’s reacquisition of its monopoly
position was thus not the failure of the Kingsbury Commitment in
1913 but rather a change in the way the Commitment was enforced
after 1916. In this regard, the historical account presented in the book
misses two key factors: the assent of the Independent telephone
industry and the intercession of the federal government.
Consider first the role of the Independent telephone industry.
The historical record reveals a dynamic that is much more complex
and interesting than the simple hegemony of a corporate giant. The
period of aggressive Bell acquisitions between 1907 and 1913
produced a storm of complaints by the Independents, which were
30
received favorably by the antitrust authorities. By 1915, however, the
nature of competition began to shift as the market neared saturation.
Instead of racing for customers that did not yet have service, the
Independents had to compete head-to-head for customers already
served by Bell. Major portions of the Independent telephone industry
had little stomach for such a bruising battle and began searching
31
instead for ways to consolidate with the Bell System. It was only at
this point that the Independents conceived of modifying the
Kingsbury Commitment to permit the Bell System to acquire
Independent telephone companies so long as it disgorged an
32
equivalent number of lines. Thus, between 1913 and 1916, opposition
by the Independent telephone industry was enough to thwart
Theodore Vail’s imperial aspirations. It was only in 1917, after the
Independent telephone companies began supporting the endeavor,
33
that reconsolidation was permitted to occur.
The other key factor was the federal government. What is often
overlooked is that for a brief span running from August 1, 1918, to
August 1, 1919, the US government took over the telephone system
and placed it under the supervision of Postmaster General Albert
Burleson. The story is too long to tell here in detail, and the forces
34
driving the move were complex. For now, it suffices to note that one
30 See Kenneth N. Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design: Telecommunications
Regulation in Historical and Theoretical Perspective *113–14, 120–21 (unpublished PhD
dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1988) (on file at University of Wisconsin–
Madison); Gabel, 34 Law & Contemp Probs at 352 (cited in note 9).
31 See Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design at *123–24 (cited in note 30). Indeed, the
heterogeneity of the Independent telephone companies left them vulnerable to divide-andconquer strategies. Mueller, Universal Service at 112 (cited in note 7); Bornholz and Evans, Early
History of Competition at 28 (cited in note 9).
32 See Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design at *125 (cited in note 30).
33 See id at *126–27.
34 The decision was influenced by the fact that Britain had recently nationalized its
telephone system, the US government had recently taken over the railroad system, and
Postmaster General Albert Burleson had been a longtime advocate of government ownership of
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of Burleson’s central commitments was to run the telephone system
like the postal system—that is, on a unified basis. The day after taking
control, Burleson issued an order making clear that the purpose of
government control of the telephone system was “to coordinate and
unify these services so that they may be operated as a national
35
system.” Six days later, he issued another bulletin noting that
“[g]overnmental operation and control of the telephone systems of the
country would undoubtedly cause the coordination and consolidation
36
of competing systems wherever possible.” To encourage the
unification
of
the
service,
Burleson
indicated
that
“negotiations . . . already under way for the consolidation of a number
of competing telephone systems at the time the Government assumed
37
control . . . should be continued.” Where such negotiations had not
yet begun, Burleson made clear that he had “no objection to the
38
companies taking up such negotiations.”
Another bulletin followed eight days later ordering companies
“[t]o proceed as expeditiously as possible with the plans heretofore
instituted for consolidating and unifying the telephone plants and
39
properties.” In areas where such plans were not yet underway,
consolidation plans “should be formulated as soon as practicable”
wherever consolidation “is manifestly desired by the public” and “can
40
be effected on fair terms and in accordance with law.” Where two
competing operators continued to operate, Burleson ordered them to
“cooperate in making extensions and betterments” in order to
41
promote “unification and the elimination of waste.” On the same day,
Burleson issued another order creating the Committee on Solicitation
of Telephone Systems, consisting of AT&T Vice President Nathan C.
Kingsbury and the president of one of the Independents, “for the
purpose of making the necessary investigations, conducting
negotiations, and arriving at agreements for the unification and
consolidation of the various telephone companies operating in the
the telephone system. For a more complete account, see Christopher S. Yoo and Michael Janson,
The Federal Takeover of the U.S. Telephone System During World War I *Part II (unpublished
manuscript, 2011) (on file with authors).
35 US Post Office, Bulletin No 2: Assuming Possession and Control (Aug 1, 1918), in
Government Control and Operation of Telegraph, Telephone, and Marine Cable Systems, August 1,
1918 to July 31, 1919 62, 62 (GPO 1921).
36 US Post Office, Bulletin No 3: Consolidation of Competing Telephone Systems (Aug 7,
1918), in Government Control 62, 62 (cited in note 35).
37 Id at 63.
38 Id.
39 US Post Office, Bulletin No 4: Extensions and Betterments Curtailed (Aug 15, 1918), in
Government Control 63, 63 (cited in note 35).
40 Id.
41 Id.
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42

same community.” The report issued after the end of the takeover
noted with great pride the postmaster general’s support for
“consolidations for the purpose of getting rid of pernicious
competition and wasteful operation” and his approval of thirty-four
43
consolidations of competing telephone operations during this period.
The reconsolidation of the telephone industry was thus as much
the product of the accession of the Independent telephone industry
and the policies of the federal government as the industrial
machinations of Theodore Vail. Indeed, the post office could unify the
system far more decisively and quickly than the Bell System ever
could. Any attempt to fit this historical episode back into the Cycle by
suggesting that the Bell System was the moving force behind the
government takeover is belied by the fact that everyone expected that
Burleson’s first order of business was to fire Vail and that Vail evaded
the sack only by promising to do whatever the postmaster general
44
wanted.
The flowering of the Independent telephone companies and the
eventual retrenchment of the industry in the hands of AT&T thus
represent an imperfect fit with Wu’s Cycle. Instead of a new
technological environment opened by a group of people committed to
openness and closed by the actions of a corporate mogul, we find a
situation in which both the forces challenging the incumbent and the
means through which the incumbent was able to reassert its
dominance to be much more complex. Analysis of these complexities
promises to yield a richer sense of the interactions between
innovation, commercial interests, and government actors obscured by
attempts to make this episode conform to some predetermined
pattern.
B.

The Breakup of AT&T

The event marking the second turn of the Cycle in the telephone
industry is the breakup of AT&T (pp 194–95). On a superficial level,
splitting the Bell System into a long-distance company (AT&T), seven
local telephone companies (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth,
NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, SBC, and US West), and an equipment
42 US Post Office, Committee on Consolidation of Telephone Systems (Aug 15, 1918), in
Government Control 63, 63–64 (cited in note 33).
43 US Post Office, Report of the Postmaster General on the Supervision and Operation of
the Telegraph, Telephone, and Cable Properties (Oct 31, 1919), in Government Control 5, 10, 11
(cited in note 35).
44 See Albert Bigelow Paine, In One Man’s Life: Being Chapters from the Personal and
Business Career of Theodore N. Vail 318–23 (Harper 1921). See also John Brooks, Telephone: The
First Hundred Years 152 (Harper & Row 1975).
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company (Lucent Technologies) would appear a likely candidate for a
return to openness.
On closer inspection, however, the parallels between these
episodes become less clear. As an initial matter, the type of openness
implicated by the breakup of AT&T is very different from the type of
openness at issue during the era of Independent telephony. Openness
during that period was the direct result of the emergence of direct
competition in local telephone service (p 48). Thus, the type of
interconnection at issue was fundamentally horizontal.
The judicial proceedings ordering the breakup of AT&T, in
contrast, abandoned all hope of inducing direct competition between
45
multiple local telephone service providers. Instead, the breakup was
designed to promote competition in complementary services, such as
long-distance, customer-premises equipment, and data-processing
services (the last of which were direct precursors to the modern
Internet) (pp 189–91). Providers of these complementary services did
not want to replace AT&T’s local telephone network and provide
services instead of AT&T. They wanted to access AT&T’s local
telephone network so they could provide services in addition to those
provided by AT&T. In short, they sought to offer complements to the
local telephone network, not substitutes. The type of interconnection
these firms sought was thus not horizontal but rather vertical. Wu’s
other work recognizes that horizontal and vertical interconnection
45 See United States v Western Electric Co, 673 F Supp 525, 537 (DDC 1987) (concluding
that under the breakup of AT&T, ³[t]he exchange monopoly of the Regional Companies has
continued because it is a natural monopoly´), affd 894 F2d 1387 (DC Cir 1990); In the Matter of
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 14171, 14173–74 ¶ 4 (1996) (noting that the
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat 1064, codified as amended at 47 USC § 151 et seq, was
grounded on the notion that local telephony constituted a natural monopoly and that “[t]he
Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) that required AT&T to divest the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) in 1984 was not so much a repudiation as a reduction in the scope of this
paradigm”). For other high-profile acknowledgements that local telephone service remained a
natural monopoly, see Verizon Communications Inc v FCC, 535 US 467, 475–76 (2002); Stephen
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 291 (Harvard 1982); Alfred E. Kahn, 2 The Economics of
Regulation: Principles and Institutions 127 (Wiley & Sons 1971).
It is true that the breakup divided the local telephone companies into seven geographically
distinct Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), each providing local telephone service in
a different part of the country. But doing so did not create direct competitors: a customer in
Chicago could receive service from only one RBOC, Ameritech. Simply put, two firms are not
competitors simply because they participate in the same product market. Firms that sell the same
product may be limited in the areas that they serve. To be competitors, they must also participate
in the same geographic market. Thus, although RBOCs sold the same products, they operated
mutually exclusive service areas and thus were not direct competitors. From the standpoint of
retail markets, mergers between RBOCs are properly regarded as conglomerate mergers rather
than horizontal mergers. Peter W. Huber, Michael K. Kellogg, and John Thorne, Federal
Telecommunications Law §§ 7.5.2–7.5.3 at 626–32 (Aspen 2d ed 1999).
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raise very different concerns, but he glosses over this key distinction
when treating the Independent telephone era and the breakup of
AT&T as part of the same Cycle. As a general matter, horizontal
practices raise significantly greater economic concern than vertical
ones. In addition, horizontal and vertical remedies are targeted toward
very different policy outcomes. The former is designed to break up a
monopoly. The latter intends to leave the monopoly in place and
simply insist that it be shared.
The differences between horizontal and vertical relationships
make it difficult to regard the first two historical episodes in the
telephone industry as being of a piece. Another difficulty arises from
the mechanism through which the market opened. In the case of
Independent telephony, the market opened through competitive entry.
In the case of the breakup of AT&T, Wu sees the government as the
key driver, led by the White House (p 187), backed by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) (pp 188–91), and finished by the
antitrust courts (p 193). Given the Reagan administration’s emphasis
on deregulation and competitive markets, Wu suggests that the
government must have regarded AT&T’s efforts to preserve its
monopoly as “blasphemy” (p 193).
Again, a broader look at the history yields a story with more
interesting twists and turns. The atmosphere surrounding monopoly
and deregulation was quite complex. On the one hand, deregulation
enjoyed widespread intellectual and political support, perhaps best
demonstrated by the deregulation of the airline industry during the
Carter administration in 1978 under the leadership of Senator Ted
Kennedy and Stephen Breyer, who was then serving as chief counsel
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. On the other hand, the decision to
proceed with the breakup of AT&T must be viewed side by side with
the Reagan administration’s other signature antitrust policy decision:
the termination of the longstanding case against IBM. The fact that
the administration reached different opinions in the IBM case and the
AT&T case suggests it was applying a nuanced, context-sensitive
vision of competition policy rather than mechanically pursing an
47
ideology.
Equally interesting is the inconsistency of the government’s
support for openness. Although the FCC would eventually support
liberalizing markets for long-distance services and customer-premises
equipment, it initially refused to do so and instead sided with AT&T,
46 See Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J Telecomm & High Tech L 15, 36–38 (2006).
47 See Richard Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the Antitrust Arena: An Economist’s
Appreciation, 51 Stan L Rev 1317, 1325–27 (1999).
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until the courts overturned its decisions and forced it to reverse
48
course. As discussed below, this episode is more properly regarded as
supporting Wu’s ambivalence about whether government is part of the
problem or part of the solution rather than as an example where the
49
government played a positive role in helping open a technology.
C.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Merger
Wave of the 2000s

The final turn of the Cycle in the telephone industry begins with
50
the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and ends with
SBC’s acquisition of AT&T in 2007 (pp 243–44, 252). The dynamics of
this episode are particularly complex. Wu’s argument is that the
telecommunications industry hid behind the ideology of deregulation
to push through a statute that effectively insulated it from antitrust
scrutiny and then used litigation to render the implementation of that
statute a nullity. At the same time, they used mergers to reconstruct the
Bell System despite the lack of meaningful competition (pp 242–48).
History has shown the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to be a
deeply flawed piece of legislation, although the specific critique
51
offered differs from person to person. The statute’s flaws are evident
in the fact that the crown jewel was supposed to be the restoration of
local telephone companies’ ability to offer long-distance service. As it
turns out, by 1996 long distance had begun to become so competitive
48 See In the Matter of Hush-A-Phone Corp, 20 FCC2d 391, 418–20 (1955), revd 238 F2d 266
(DC Cir 1956); In the Matter of MCI Telecommunications Corp, 60 FCC2d 25, 41–44 (1976), revd
561 F2d 365 (DC Cir 1977); In the Matter of Petition of American Telephone and Telegraph
Company for a Declaratory Ruling and Expedited Relief, 67 FCC2d 1455, 1479 (1978), revd under
the name of MCI Telecommunications Corp v FCC, 580 F2d 590, 596–97 (DC Cir 1978).
49 See Part V.
50 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996), codified at
47 USC § 151 et seq.
51 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 Yale J Reg 315, 315–16 (2005) (“There is widespread agreement today
on all sides of the telecommunications wars that something is deeply flawed with the design or
implementation (or both) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”). For criticisms that the Act
deterred investment, see, for example, Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Networks in
Telecommunications: Economics and Law 274–76 (Cambridge 2009); Robert W. Crandall, Allan
T. Ingraham, and Hal J. Singer, Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based
Investment?, 4 Topics Econ Analysis & Pol *1–4 (2004), online at http://www.bepress.com/topics
/vol4/iss1/art14 (visited June 8, 2011); Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, A ConsumerWelfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 Yale L
J 417, 457–61 (1999). For criticisms of the Act’s theoretical soundness and administrability, see,
for example, Spulber and Yoo, Networks in Telecommunications at 272–74 (cited in note 51);
Mark A. Lemley and Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?,
85 Tex L Rev 783, 809–13 (2007); Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:
Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 Stan L
Rev 1249, 1279–84 (1999).
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that rates dropped to no more than a few pennies per minute. In fact,
wireless providers do not even charge more for long-distance calls,
instead simply treating long-distance minutes the same as local
53
minutes. They typically do not allow subscribers to choose their own
long-distance provider, and yet given that wireless long distance is
essentially free, consumers are left with little room to complain about
the lack of choice. Moreover, the extent to which the 1996 Act
exempted telephone companies from antitrust scrutiny is easily
overstated. Although the disputes over access rates are now largely
exempt from regulatory scrutiny, notwithstanding the Act, the mergers
that are the focus of Wu’s concern still had to pass review by the
54
antitrust authorities and the FCC.
On a more fundamental level, attempts to draw parallels between
the structure of the modern telecommunications industry and the
industry structure that preceded the breakup of the Bell System are a
bit disingenuous. The new AT&T bears little resemblance to the old
AT&T. Prior to the breakup, AT&T had essentially a nationwide
55
reach and controlled over 80 percent of the market. The new AT&T
faces a far different reality. As an initial matter, AT&T can only offer
local telephone service in roughly half the country. Moreover, it now
faces vigorous competition from other telephone providers. The
number of wireless telephone subscribers reached over 277 million by
the end of 2008, more than double the number of total wireline
56
subscribers. Moreover, in the first half of 2009, an estimated
21 percent of adults relied exclusively on their wireless phones for
57
voice service. Approximately 29 million households now rely on
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) provided by cable companies and
other Internet providers to provide voice services, which represents

52 See FCC Industry Analysis & Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau,
Reference Book of Rates, Price Indices and Household Expenditures for Telephone Service
table 1.15
(2008),
online
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC284934A1.pdf (visited June 8, 2011); In re Section 63.71 Application of Verizon Long Distance
LLC for Authority to Discontinue Domestic Telecommunications Services, 25 FCC Rcd 8447,
8451 ¶ 51 (2010) (noting the existence of prepaid phone cards charging less than two cents per
minute for domestic long distance).
53 See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 25 FCC Rcd 11407, 11469 ¶ 87 (2010) (noting that all nationwide
service providers and many smaller operators offer national flat-rate pricing plans that include
“bucket[s]” of minutes that can be used nationwide without incurring long-distance charges).
54 Verizon Communications v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398, 406–07 (2004).
55 See US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984 560 & table 948
(GPO 104th ed 1983).
56 See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b), 25 FCC Rcd at 11505 ¶ 155.
57 See id at 11603 ¶¶ 339–40.
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nearly 20 percent of the market and is continuing to grow. In
addition, WiFi hotspots and other wireless LAN services have become
59
important bases for voice communications. In the Internet era,
moreover, people communicate in more diverse ways than by making
phone calls. Although it was once common to think of data as an
application riding on a voice network, voice is now more properly
regarded as an application riding over a data network. Indeed, in a
world increasingly dominated by text messaging, young mobile phone
60
users typically do not use the voice feature of their phones at all.
The result is that the number of telephone lines provided by
incumbents has been in steep decline, dropping from a high of
61
193 million in December 2000 to a low of 122 million as of June
62
2010. Indeed, many incumbents are looking for opportunities to exit
the telephone business altogether, as demonstrated by Verizon’s
63
recent sale of a number of rural telephone systems to Frontier.
Indeed, concerns about AT&T’s supposedly dominant position in
telephony seems singularly misplaced when scholars are saying that
cable is the new natural monopoly with which other technologies
64
cannot hope to compete.
Most importantly, the mechanism supposedly used to close the
industry during this turn of the Cycle is much more elaborate than
mere aggrandizement by an industry mogul. The scheme discussed
requires a high degree of sophistication, involving the co-option of the
legislative process, strategic use of regulation, and the ability to
convince antitrust authorities to sanction anticompetitive mergers.
58 See Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2010 2 figure 1
(Mar 2011), online at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-305297A1.pdf
(visited June 8, 2011).
59 See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b), 25 FCC Rcd at 11605–10
¶¶ 343–50 (showing huge growth in use of those resources, including 500 percent growth for
AT&T from 2008 to 2009).
60 Id at 11431 ¶ 8, 11521 ¶ 176, 11526 ¶ 180 (noting that consumers are increasingly willing
to substitute messaging and data services for voice, with teen usage being a major driver of
mobile messaging growth).
61 See Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2002 table 1
(Dec 2002), online at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD
/lcom1202.pdf (visited Apr 28, 2011) (showing a steady decline in lines provided by incumbents).
62 See Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2010 at 1 (cited
in note 58).
63 See Applications Filed by Frontier Communications Corp. and Verizon Communications
Inc. for Assignment or Transfer of Control, 25 FCC Rcd 5972, 5973 ¶ 1 (2010).
64 See Susan P. Crawford, The Looming Cable Monopoly, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev Inter Alia
34, 40 (2010), online at http://yalelawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/YLPRIA29_Crawford.pdf
(visited Apr 28, 2011).
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Such a theory requires a good deal more analytical structure on how
incumbents can use a variety of government processes to close
markets than the simple, mogul-driven vision Wu originally proposed.
While this scenario is certainly plausible, significantly more analysis is
required before it becomes more than just an amorphous concern.
***
The examples drawn from the telephone industry are
considerably more complex than the simple exposition of the Cycle
would lead one to believe. Instead, a closer examination of the
historical context reveals rich and multifaceted dynamics surrounding
the nature of the parties, the particular vision of openness being
pursued, the role of the government, and the specific mechanisms by
which an industry transforms from open to closed and back. As is so
often the case, real-world examples resist being reduced into simple
stories. Although a more detailed exploration of the history of the
telephone industry would not fit so easily into the simple narrative Wu
advances, it would have yielded greater insight into forces that shape
and reshape the way technologically driven industries evolve.
II. RADIO AND TELEVISION
The second major industry that Wu examines is broadcasting. His
narrative begins with the early days of radio and the emergence of
television and culminates with the advent of cable television.
Although each example exhibits some of the features of Wu’s Cycle,
each deviates from the pattern in important ways that invite further
analysis.
A. Radio
Wu’s narrative on the history of radio centers on David Sarnoff,
the president of the Radio Company of America (RCA) and its
wholly owned subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC).
The first turn of the Cycle occurred when Sarnoff and RCA took the
open technology that was early radio (p 39) and subdued it by the
mid-1930s (p 84). Faced with the fact that AT&T’s long-distance
network provided “the only practical means of moving sound around
the nation” (p 76), Sarnoff used patent litigation to induce AT&T to
abandon radio altogether (pp 79–81). In addition, Sarnoff protected
RCA’s legacy AM radio business by preventing FM, which first
emerged in the 1930s, from becoming an important medium until the
1970s (pp 133, 135).
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Told in this way, the story of radio fits Wu’s great-man account of
a media mogul who crushes the opposition. Yet the account of
Sarnoff-as-monopolist works only if one overlooks the fact that NBC
faced serious competition throughout its existence. Beginning in the
mid-1920s, first Arthur Judson and then William Paley built the
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) into a serious rival to NBC. In
this case, CBS was able to use government pressure to force AT&T to
65
open its long-distance lines to networks other than NBC. Yet CBS
appears only a few times in Wu’s narrative, usually in passing as part
of a budding duopoly (pp 83, 132, 139). There is no exploration of how
CBS managed to survive, let alone thrive. And while CBS makes a
brief appearance, the Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS), which
66
represented the other major rival to NBC, is completely missing.
Sarnoff’s control over radio was thus far from airtight, which makes
this episode an uncomfortable fit with Wu’s Cycle.
B.

Broadcast Television

Wu’s history of the introduction of television in the US also
revolves around Sarnoff, and it may provide the best example of the
Cycle. But the smoothness of Wu’s account, like his history of radio, is
achieved by deemphasizing certain aspects of the historical record. Wu
begins with a familiar history of the invention of television, focusing
on the struggles of three inventors—John Logie Blair, Charles Francis
Jenkins, and Philo T. Farnsworth—to bring their devices to market in
the 1920s and 1930s (pp 136–37, 139–42, 148–51).
At first, television appeared to be the perfect Schumpeterian
disruptive technology, poised to replace radio (p 135). But television
took two decades to reach a mass market, a fact that incenses Wu. He
holds radio mogul David Sarnoff primarily responsible, framing the
story as a clash between naïve inventors and a rapacious capitalist. As
the head of RCA, Sarnoff used all of his influence to retard and
control the adoption of the new medium. Sarnoff, Wu suggests, did not
want to kill radio’s new competition. He was experienced enough to
see that television was an unstoppable force, possibly even an
opportunity (p 139). Rather than futilely trying to eliminate the new
medium, Sarnoff did everything that he could to ensure that when
television eventually reached the US market, it would do so as an

65 See Erik Barnouw, 1 A History of Broadcasting in the United States: A Tower in Babel 195
(Oxford 1966).
66 See Herman S. Hettinger, Broadcasting Advertising Trends in 1935, 1 National Marketing
Review 301, 311 (1936) (describing MBS as a network “firmly established as a portion of the
broadcasting structure” by the end of 1935).
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extension of his “empire of the air,” as Lee de Forest called it. To
achieve his victory and control the new medium, Sarnoff publicly
disparaged television as an “experimental” technology, and he
successfully coaxed the FCC to label it as such (pp 138–46).
Wu inveighs against the FCC’s efforts to block the introduction
of television, and he invokes Friedrich Hayek to ask, “How can
government possibly have enough information to know when
something as unpredictable as a technology is ‘ready?’ . . . [S]ome
measure of regulation by the government was, of course, to be
expected. But even this fact cannot justify a total freeze on
commercial television lasting two decades” (p 145). In contrast to his
condemnation of the FCC, Wu yearns for the open period of
“permissionless innovation” that existed briefly when Herbert Hoover
gave out ad hoc radio licenses as the secretary of commerce (p 145).
As alternatives to the US’s lack of action, Wu points to launches
of television in Germany and England in the 1930s, and he speculates
about the television innovation that might have been had Sarnoff and
the FCC not intervened (pp 147–48). Instead of a vibrant television
industry in the 1920s, however, America saw Sarnoff reveal RCA’s
plans to introduce television at the 1939 World’s Fair in Queens,
erasing the decades of inventors and inventions that had come before
(pp 151–53). In this particular incarnation of the Cycle, Sarnoff-asKronos successfully ate his children and lived on as his own successor
(or something like that). Farnsworth had some small revenge when he
forced RCA to pay a licensing fee to use his television patent, but by
then Sarnoff had effectively taken control (p 153). And even so, Wu
acknowledges that television never enjoyed the amateur,
noncommercial phase typically associated with his conception of the
Cycle (p 154).
This is the neatest and one of the most compelling stories in the
book. Indeed, master storytellers Aaron Sorkin and Ken Burns have
68
told this story themselves in other works. But it is also a story that
overlooks some important history in order to paint an emotional
picture of personal battles. It also tends to overread current issues
back into history. (For example, the phrase “permissionless
innovation” that Wu uses to talk about early television actually comes
from Vint Cerf, as Wu acknowledges (p 145).) What Wu fails to
mention in his reveries about the lost possibilities for TV in the 1930s
67 See Lee de Forest, Father of Radio: The Autobiography of Lee de Forest 4 (Wilcox &
Follett 1950).
68 Aaron Sorkin, The Farnsworth Invention 96–101 (Samuel French 2010) (dramatizing an
imaginary scene in which Sarnoff attempts to hire Farnsworth after being forced to pay him
royalties); Ken Burns, Empire of the Air: The Men Who Made Radio (PBS Home Video 1991).
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is that television had very limited success as a commercial medium in
Europe before the Second World War. In Germany, the Nazis feared
69
that television in homes might lead to private mockery of Hitler. In
Britain, only 20,000 television sets were sold before the outbreak of
70
World War II. It is possible that without opposition from Sarnoff and
the FCC, television technology would have found a successful market
in the US. But it is also possible that the capital, infrastructure, and
cultural acceptance might have lagged, as they did in Europe.
Wu’s great-man theory of history erases the complex and
fascinating process of innovation and diffusion. Blair, Jenkins,
Farnsworth, and Sarnoff are all clearly central figures in the
development of television. Innovation, however, requires technology,
capital, and culture to come together. Moreover, the television
inventors did not come out of nowhere. They built on the many
inventors who experimented with cathode ray tubes both privately
and under the auspices of large companies like Bell Labs and Western
Electric. The economic effects of the Great Depression and World
War II are also important elements to the story to which Wu alludes
only briefly (pp 146, 147, 154). Stories of great men make for great
dramas, but they also require a belief in social vacuums that do not
really exist.
C.

Cable Television

The history of cable television bears some of the trappings of
Wu’s usual view of the Cycle. The industry’s early days bore witness to
advocates driven by idealistic motives, such as Ralph Lee Smith, Fred
Friendly, and the Sloan Foundation (pp 176–77, 181–83). In other ways,
however, cable industry was quite different. Two figures in particular
receive credit for promoting an industry that challenged the big three
television networks.
The first is President Richard Nixon, who supported the key
regulatory decisions that made cable possible (pp 177, 184–85).
Although Wu does not credit him explicitly, Nixon even pioneered the
term “separations policy” (p 184) that would become in name and
substance the core of Wu’s policy recommendation. As Wu notes,
Nixon’s motives were far from above reproach, given that his desire to
promote cable was driven by a desire to retaliate against the broadcast
television networks that were causing him so much grief (p 185).
69 William Uricchio, Introduction to the History of German Television, 1935–1944, 10 Hist J
Film Radio & Television 115, 115–16 (1990).
70 See Asa Briggs, 2 The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The Golden Age
of Wireless 583 (Oxford 1961).
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Despite this, Nixon remains one of the seminal figures in promoting
the cable industry.
The second is Ted Turner, who Wu regards as a mogul cut from
the same cloth as Theodore Vail (p 208). Unlike the typical moguls in
Wu’s Cycle, who use the corporate clout of a dominant incumbent to
force industries to close, Turner was an outsider who pushed the
industry toward openness. This proves once again how a close analysis
of actual facts can reveal dynamics that are far more interesting than
simple parables.
***
In short, each of these three episodes deviates from Wu’s vision
of the Cycle in important ways. With respect to radio, Sarnoff’s efforts
to leverage NBC’s market must be viewed in light of the fierce
competition it continued to face from CBS and MBS. Wu’s account of
the stillborn early days of broadcast television does not grapple with
the role played by the Depression and World War II, and even then he
candidly acknowledges that it did not enjoy the usual initial period of
openness typically associated with the Cycle. With respect to cable,
primary credit for ushering in a new era of openness in the television
industry goes to a US President and the type of mogul usually
associated with closedness, although one who began his career as an
industry outsider. Unfortunately, the bases for these variations in the
patterns and the insights from examining the interactions of a more
complex set of forces remain unexplored.
III. MOTION PICTURES
Wu tells four stories about the American film industry. He starts
with an account of the fall of the first American film oligopoly, the
Motion Picture Patents Company, also known as the Edison Trust. He
then turns to the coercive distribution practices of the early Hollywood
studios. In the third film chapter, Wu considers the workings and impact
of the motion picture “Production Code” that studios adopted in the
1930s to sanitize film content. And in a final chapter on film since the
1960s, Wu examines the methods media conglomerates have developed
to manage risk in the uncertain business of making blockbuster movies.
These are some of the major turning points in the development of the
American film industry, and in Wu’s hands, they offer lessons in how
centralized control of cultural industries have limited free expression
and shaped the marketplace of ideas.
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In his study of the American film industry, Wu eschews the
economic and industrially focused film scholarship that has flourished
71
since the 1970s. Instead, he relies on the autobiographies of film
moguls, and he revives the work of some of the earliest film historians,
like experimental filmmaker Lewis Jacobs, Hollywood producerdirector Benjamin Hampton, and (surprisingly) the French neoFascists Maurice Bardèche and Robert Brasillach. This fuels Wu’s
great-man perspective on history, and we get a picture of the film
industry through the eyes of its once and would-be oligarchs. This
approach allows Wu to tell a lively story of intense personalities and
representative moments in the history of the American film industry.
It also suggests indirectly that the evil that must somehow be checked
is individual ambition and not necessarily media consolidation itself.
A. The Edison Trust versus the Independents
In the chapter on the early film industry, Wu recounts the
standoff between the Edison Trust and the group of independent
companies that challenged it. This is a bit of a divergence from his
investigation of other industries, which all start with narratives about
the openness that accompanies new inventions. And, indeed, the
history of the film industry that preceded the Edison Trust would have
been a perfect illustration of the Cycle that Wu posits. Film technology
emerged simultaneously in the United States and many countries in
72
Western Europe. The technologies varied widely, and so did the
businesses that grew up to exploit them. Edison developed peep show
movie houses, called kinetoscope parlors, for audiences to view short
films individually, like they listened to phonographs in Edison’s
successful phonograph parlors. Other inventors built on the model of
vaudeville or magic-lantern slide shows, developing projectors to
display films to large audiences. These new devices required content
and exhibition spaces, and many small companies arose to make films
or set up small nickelodeons. Some of the early film exhibitors like
Samuel Goldwyn and Adolf Zukor went on to become important
moguls, but many more were pushed out of business by the rise of the

71 See generally, for example, Robert Sklar, Movie-Made America: A Cultural History of
American Movies (Vintage 1975) (chronicling the social and economic path of the film industry);
Douglas Gomery, The Coming of Sound to American Cinema: A History of the Transformation of
an Industry (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1975) (on file with
the University of Wisconsin–Madison).
72 Sklar, Movie-Made America at 5–12 (cited in note 71) (describing creative efforts of
inventors from Paris to Palo Alto, as well as the race in the United States, Great Britain, France,
and Germany to achieve working motion-picture cameras).
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Edison Trust. The pre-Trust years are a great example of the
openness that Wu sees at the start of new industries and longs to have
preserved. It is curious that he does not spend more than a few
sentences on it.
The Edison Trust was formed in 1909 when the Edison
Manufacturing Company, the Eastman Company, and other leading
film equipment manufacturers, producers, distributors, and theater
owners pooled their patents and cut licensing deals in an attempt to
corner the entire American film market. The Trust succeeded briefly,
but their extortive pricing, litigiousness, and failure to innovate led a
group of independent film producers and exhibitors to effectuate a
successful coup only a few years into the Trust’s reign. Trust members
put their energy into crushing the competition through aggressive
business tactics and lawsuits, with the Trust suing one leader of
the Independents, Carl Laemmle, 289 times over a three-year period
(p 68). But while the Trust members focused on gaining complete
control of the industry, the Independents focused on content. They
pioneered the use of film stars, and they standardized feature-length
films (pp 61–63). At the time, the film industry was growing to meet
the interests of the middle-class audience that was drawn to feature
films, a form that better lent itself to the pacing of legitimate theater
and novels. They were also drawn to the glamour of stars, especially
when they came from the stage, like Sarah Bernhardt (p 62). The Trust
members became so invested in their calcifying business model that
they missed the importance of these changes. Indeed, they fought
against them: Who wanted to pay actors more money once they
achieved star status?
As he does throughout the book, Wu points to the cultural
implications of the kind of consolidation that the Trust achieved. “In
an information industry,” he writes incisively, “the cost of monopoly
must not be measured in dollars alone” (p 69). During the brief reign
of the Trust, creative innovation among Trust members came to a halt;
we know this because innovation continued outside the system, in the
sphere of the Independents. Wu characterizes the Trust’s tactics as
representing “an essential tension between free expression and
intellectual property” (p 68). And he explains the inevitable failure of
such a tight-fisted choke hold on the market.
While condemning the Trust, Wu celebrates the Independents’
flight to the West Coast, and he describes Los Angeles as a den of
freedom for “industry outlaws on the lam” (p 68). As even Wu
73 See id at 141 (listing Goldwyn and Zukor among those who “held power over movies”);
id at 34–41 (narrating the Edison Trust’s early dominance in the film industry).
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intimates, this is a romantic notion of the early LA film industry. Film
production in LA predates the formation of the Trust, and there were
many rational reasons for film companies to relocate from Fort Lee,
New Jersey—the first American movie capital—to LA. Perhaps the
primary reasons were the weather and terrain. In the years before
74
roughly 1914, when Klieg lights made indoor shooting feasible, the
warm Southern California weather and long days permitted many
more hours of shooting a year than the filmmakers could get back
east. And the coastline, desert, and mountains near LA have
continued to provide great backdrops for stories set in seemingly far75
off locales.
Even if the Independents were not the free-spirited pirates Wu
paints them to be, they did successfully challenge the Trust. First, they
surpassed the Trust aesthetically, and then they supported the
government’s efforts to break up the cartel in a federal district court
76
in 1915. The Trust thus lasted only six years, a period of time more
consistent with the tumult of an emerging industry than with the
innovation- and creativity-killing dynamics associated with the Cycle.
Moreover, Wu claims that, following the victory, “[t]he American film
industry was, for the first time, an open industry” (p 72). But was it?
The Independents hastened the downfall of one oligopoly, the Edison
Trust, but, as we will see in the next section, they replaced it with
another.
B.

The Birth of Hollywood

The closed system controlled by the Edison Trust was followed
immediately by another closed system. The Independents of the early
1910s, men (and they were all men) like Adolph Zukor, Carl
Laemmle, William Fox, and William W. Hodkinson, quickly emerged
as the leaders of film studios like Universal, Paramount, and
Twentieth-Century Fox—the studios, that is, that formed the new
oligopoly that we have come to call Hollywood. And with some
reshuffling, it is that oligopoly that remains in control of the
entertainment industry today. Wu’s second story of the film industry
addresses the swift closing of the newly opened industry. He explains
how film mogul Adolph Zukor and some of his underlings at
Paramount studios introduced a new centralized distribution system
to the recently opened circuit of movie theaters. Where the Trust had
relied on exclusive contracts with its theater owners, Zukor used the
74
75
76

See Peter Baxter, On the History and Ideology of Film Lighting, 16 Screen 83, 90–91 (1975).
See Sklar, Movie-Made America at 67–69 (cited in note 71).
See United States v Motion Picture Patents Co, 225 F 800, 807–10 (ED Pa 1915).
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power of his star actors and high-profile Broadway adaptations to
impose oppressive terms on the exhibitors. Zukor dictated that if the
exhibitors wanted a new Mary Pickford film, they would have to buy
the entire year’s run of Paramount films as a single block. Not only
would they have to buy the entire block, but they would have to do it
“blind”—that is, sight unseen (pp 86–87, 93–97).
“Was block booking really such a bad thing?” Wu wonders in this
chapter (p 95). As a matter of pure economics, Wu concedes the
answer may well be no. Many industries have turned to bulk sales to
accommodate the scale of large industries, and Wu concedes that the
scholarly defenses of the practice offered by Nobel prize-winning
Chicago School scholar George Stigler and UCLA antitrust expert
77
Benjamin Klein “might be right” (p 96). Wu nonetheless argues that
two other concerns justify judicial hostility toward block booking.
First, by simultaneously adopting block-booking regimes during the
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the market leaders effectively kept their
competition out of the market. The studios did not explicitly collude,
but they did simultaneously work to freeze competitors out through
practices that Wu calls “parallel exclusion” (p 97). Second, industries
that peddle expression are different. In the sphere of cultural
production, the combination of block booking and oligopolistic
structure severely limited the range of voices that could get to the
movie-going audience, both in the US and abroad, where the
Hollywood studios controlled most markets.
Both of these claims are quite contestable. Although some
antitrust scholars have long argued that parallel behavior in an
78
oligopolistic industry creates the same harm as collusion, courts and
other antitrust scholars have generally rejected such arguments based
on the difficulty of fashioning a remedy that requires a firm to deviate
79
from the rate of output that is individually rational. Second, as

77 See generally George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s, Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking,
1963 Sup Ct Rev 152; Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking,
26 J L & Econ 497, 538–39 (1983).
78 See, for example, Richard Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 Stan L Rev 1562, 1562 (1969) (calling for both types of activity to give rise to
liability under the Sherman Act); Philip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 1 Antitrust Law:
An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 112d at 137–38 (Aspen 3d ed 2006).
79 See Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 553–54 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd v
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 227 (1993) (“Tacit collusion, sometimes called
oligopolistic price coordination, or conscious parallelism, describes the process, not itself
illegal.”); Areeda and Hovenkamp, 6 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application ¶ 1433a at 250 (Aspen 3d ed 2006); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement
under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv L Rev 655, 656
(1962) (indicating that oligopoly pricing remained as a contentious issue for antitrust courts);
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discussed below, there is a long scholarly tradition showing that
bundling content from the same provider can actually cause the
80
quantity and variety of media programming to increase.
The film industry became fully vertically integrated, according to
Wu, in 1926, a year he calls “the turning point for American film”
(p 97). In that year, Zukor took over the large midwestern theater
chain of Balaban and Katz, solidifying his control over more than a
thousand US theaters. And the following year, Zukor and the other
studio heads successfully fought a Federal Trade Commission
investigation into their monopolistic practices. Wu chalks the latter
victory up to personal influence; through film industry lobbying,
Hollywood moguls convinced President Calvin Coolidge to appoint a
sympathetic Abram Myers to head the Commission. Myers proved
relatively lenient, although the studios fought even his minor
reprimand. And for Wu this is the end of the story. “The rise of
Hollywood and the Zukor model,” he writes, “is another definitive
closing turn of the Cycle” (p 98).
But we might also see the 1927 clash with the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) as the beginning rather than the end of the Cycle.
For the next twenty years, the US government would remain in a
continuous negotiation with the Hollywood studios over their
vertically integrated structure. The Department of Justice continued
an on-again, off-again investigation of Hollywood’s block-booking
practices, and the threat of an antitrust action kept the studios in close
81
relationships with the presidential administrations that followed.
During the Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared motion
pictures to be an essential industry, allowing them temporarily to defer
82
an antitrust investigation. Then, during World War II, Hollywood
further deferred an antitrust investigation by working for the war
83
effort. Only after World War II, in 1948, did the government finally
conclude its case against Hollywood, forcing them to divest
84
themselves of the theater chains they had acquired.
C.

The Hollywood Production Code

While the centrally controlled studio system created by Zukor
and other moguls was good for business, Wu argues, it made
Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis 110–19,
266–72 (Harvard 1959).
80 See Part V.B.
81 See Guiana Muscio, Hollywood’s New Deal 36–104 (Temple 1997).
82 See id at 117–20.
83 See id at 197–99.
84 See United States v Paramount Pictures, Inc, 334 US 131, 150–53 (1948).
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Hollywood vulnerable in another way: it made the industry more
susceptible to content control. When a few individuals held the reins
of the entire industry, it made it much easier for religious
organizations to exert pressure over the bottleneck of control. “In
fact,” Wu speculates, “had Zukor and his cohorts at Warner Bros.,
Universal, and Fox not wiped out the independent producers,
distributors, and theaters, the rule of the Production Code would not
even have been possible” (p 119).
In his third chapter on the film industry, titled “The Legion of
Decency,” Wu recounts how Hollywood came to implement the
Production Code. Wu’s history of the Production Code weaves
together an institutional analysis with personal narratives, as he
explains how Hollywood came to censor itself during the 1930s. He
tells the story of the Catholic Legion of Decency’s threats, led by
Father Daniel Lord, to boycott films, and he focuses on the underlying
anti-Semitism that drove many of the reformers who sought to impose
new standards of decency on Hollywood. Following Thomas
Dougherty’s seminal biography of top Production Code administrator
Joseph Breen, Wu relates Breen’s personal vendettas against the
studio moguls.
These biographical accounts are placed in the context of an
industrial analysis. “[I]n the United States,” Wu writes, “it is industrial
structure that determines the limits of free speech” (p 121). Congress
is prevented from abridging freedom of speech, but industries and
individuals may find ways of internally regulating what can be said.
And that is exactly what happened when Hollywood succumbed to
pressure from religious organizations (among other pressures) and
agreed to an internal system of prior restraint. Starting with a 1927
agreement, the “Don’t and Be Carefuls,” studios began to submit story
ideas, scripts, and rough cuts of films to the Motion Picture Producers
and Distributors Association for review and approval, resulting in
what Wu calls “perhaps the strictest abridgement of speech in US
history” (p 124).
A few moguls tamed by powerful social reformers is certainly one
way of reading the history of the Production Code. But over the last
thirty years or so, film industry scholars have come to see it as
something else. As early as 1909, the Edison Trust agreed to submit
films to a review body called the National Board of Censorship (later
the National Board of Review), and all Trust films had to carry the
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85

board’s seal of approval. This system certainly helped appease critics
who worried that film was spreading vice and immorality. But the seal
also helped to consolidate the Trust’s hold on the industry. Not only
did they control every stage of production and distribution, they now
had control over content as well. And the seal was one more element
binding theater owners to the exclusive display of Trust member films.
Similarly, the Production Code was a corporate document. Far
from an imposition on the studios, moguls actually had reasons to
embrace the code. For one, it helped regularize Hollywood’s product.
Like stars and genres, the regulations of the code brought some
stability to the most volatile aspect of the filmmaking process:
storytelling. With the code, the studios instituted a system with explicit
storytelling conventions. Both writers and audiences came to
understand the rules of Hollywood exposition, and the product
became much more reliable. Moreover, the code created a language
for talking about sex, crime, and politics. If explicit scenes of passion
were limited, for example, filmmakers could still develop a new
language of ambiguous symbolic cues (panning to a fireplace or
smoking a cigarette) that audiences learned to understand (or ignore
86
if they so chose). And finally, it is important to note, the Production
Code Administration did not always oppose the studios. It also helped
them. There may not have been federal censorship of movies, but in
1916, the Supreme Court declared film to be “a business pure and
87
simple,” denying First Amendment protection and opening the door
for state and local censorship. In addition, many countries had
national censorship bodies. One function of the Production Code
Administration was to ensure that films flowed freely across state and
national borders. In the case of the films such as Little Caesar and All
Quiet on the Western Front, for example, the Production Code
Administration staff went to state censor boards to make the case for
88
having the films shown despite their depictions of violence.
The Production Code did place limits on the market for ideas, as
Wu argues. But these were limits that Hollywood leaders found

85 See Richard Maltby, Censorship and Self-Regulation, in Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, ed, The
Oxford History of World Cinema 235, 235–36 (Oxford 1996) (noting that the requirement of approval
from the National Board of Censorship served both to censor and standardize the product).
86 For studies of the production code that take this approach, see id at 242. See also
Stephen Prince, Classical Film Violence: Designing and Regulating Brutality in Hollywood
Cinema, 1930–1968 252–53 (Rutgers 2003).
87 Mutual Film Corp v Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 US 230, 244 (1916), overruled
by Joseph Burstyn, Inc v Wilson, 343 US 495, 499–502 (1952).
88 See Leonard L. Jeff and Jerold L. Simmons, The Dame in the Kimono: Hollywood,
Censorship, and the Production Code from the 1920s to the 1960s 15 (Grove Weidenfield 1990).
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valuable, even desirable. Content regulation did not curb Zukor’s
business; it helped ensure its stability.
D. Conglomeration and Blockbusters
Even with the Production Code in place, however, filmmaking
has always remained a risky business, and in Wu’s fourth chapter on
the film industry, titled “Mass Production of the Sprit,” he addresses
Hollywood’s transformation from an entertainment industry into part
of a series of diversified conglomerates. In search of the changing
economic model of the film industry, Wu traces the history of two
bombs, Michael Camino’s 1980 flop Heaven’s Gate and the 2007 Steve
Carell vehicle Evan Almighty (pp 217–18, 236–37). Heaven’s Gate was
the indulgent Gesamtkunstwerk that took down a studio, United
Artists (p 218). Evan Almighty was merely a loss on a Universal
Studios balance sheet (p 237). What happened between the two flops?
Why did one have dire consequences while the other barely
registered? What happened in the intervening twenty-seven years?
According to Wu, it is the rise of the multinational, diversified
conglomerate.
Starting in the late 1960s, all of the studios either became part of a
conglomerate or they grew into multimedia communication companies
on their own. Paramount was acquired by Gulf + Western; Disney
eventually acquired radio stations, comic book publishers, and a TV
network. The effect of this conglomeration, Wu tells us, was to bring an
end to “the second open age of film” (p 218). Wu does not explain what
he means by the second open age of film, but we can assume that he is
referring to the rise of independent and semi-independent companies in
the 1960s and 1970s, companies like BBS Productions, which made Easy
Rider and started the television rock group The Monkees.
As he does in earlier chapters, Wu tells this story through the lens
of individuals. In this case he focuses primarily on executive Steve
Ross. Ross took a family conglomerate that included parking garages
and funeral homes and built a media empire around Warner Bros. Wu
might have chosen other corporate titans through which to tell this
story; Gulf + Western CEO Charles Bluhdorn, who took over
Paramount in 1966, is a candidate who would have yielded a very
different picture. Bluhdorn ruled Paramount from a distance, putting
his trust in people who knew the industry like Bob Evans and Peter
Bart. But Ross is a great example of the kind of business leader that
interests Wu. A conglomerate, as Wu colorfully defines it, “is a hydraheaded creature whose operations and advantages have mystified
lawyers and economists alike” (p 219). If conglomerates do not make
rational sense, much of the motivation for amassing media empires
can be attributed, Wu argues, to “purely personal motivations, indeed
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vanities” (p 225). Ross, for example, was known for bestowing lavish
corporate gifts on his clients and throwing company funds at
overindulged pet projects.
The takeover of Hollywood by conglomerates, however, did
change the running of the industry. Wu describes Ross as “the first
pure businessman” (p 222), as opposed to a theater owner or
producer, who hit it big in Hollywood. (We might quibble and suggest
89
that Joseph Kennedy held that title sixty years earlier.) And as a
result, Ross brought a new risk-management system to the industry.
Wu lists two new practices in particular. First, under Ross and the
conglomerates, Hollywood began to rely much more heavily on
making films based on existing products, like successful books or
cartoon characters. The film industry used to refer to these films as
“presold.” Second, film studios focused more on distribution and less
on production. They began to “mine festivals” (pp 232–33) for talent
and products, rather than having to take early risks on careers or
ideas. By the time Universal made Evan Almighty, studio economics
had changed. The days of the moguls making films gave way to
businessmen offsetting risky endeavors with tested strategies. Through
television and DVD sales, even flops like Evan Almighty could
recover some of their losses.
This example looks very different from Wu’s other explorations
of Hollywood history. When writing about the Edison Trust, block
booking, and the Production Code, we get a picture of consolidation
limiting access to the market. But conglomerates’ takeover of studios
also leads to the industry’s absorption of the Independents who
challenged it. Companies like BBS were acquired by the studios, as all
successful independent production companies have been since. And
the practice of acquiring and distributing festival films also introduced
more diversity into the market. If anything, in Wu’s account, the
introduction of conglomerates opened the system to include more
voices rather than pushing them out.
E.

It’s the Content, Stupid

The Master Switch does not attempt to offer a complete history of
the American film. As he does throughout the book, Wu focuses on a
few important nodal moments in the development of the industry in
order to distill key lessons for media industries. But Wu’s account of
the film business is very different from his account of other industries.
Here, technological change does not loom very large. He does not

89
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focus on how the coming of sound, color, home video, or digital
cinema challenged the closed order of the industry. There is no Kronos
effect in his history of Hollywood, although that might have been a
fascinating investigation. Instead, Wu seems to pick moments when
consolidation and content clash. The Independents defeated the Trust
by introducing stars and feature films. Block booking pushes
competitors out of the market. Consolidation also makes it possible
for religious groups to impose prior restraints on the industry through
the Production Code. And the conglomerates’ takeover of studios
leads to safer business practices, like relying on hits that have been
proven in other media. If there is a lesson in these chapters, it is, as he
tells us in his account of block booking, that content and not just
economics must be considered when regulating and evaluating the
structure of cultural industries and its impact on diversity. Wu,
however, does not give us any clues about how to go about measuring
the cultural value of film output.
IV. PERSONAL COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET
As with the other historical episodes appearing in the book, The
Master Switch’s history of the personal computer industry and the
Internet presents a wealth of interesting stories and personal
narratives, with the internal conflicts within Apple Computer taking
center stage. While the intramural battle between the “Two Steves” is
both fascinating and important, this dynamic should not overshadow
other aspects and actors that played a key role in shaping the personal
computer industry during its early days.
A. Early Kit Computers
In 1962, the New York Times published an interview with
electronic computing pioneer Dr. John Mauchly, one of the inventors
of both the ENIAC (arguably the world’s first functional electronic
digital computer) and the UNIVAC (the first commercially available
90
computer produced in the United States). The focus of the interview
was a yet-to-be-developed technology that Mauchly referred to
91
alternatively as a “pocket computer” and a “personal computer.”
Recent advances in miniaturized electronics made the development of
such devices “inevitable,” Mauchly argued, and the imminent
availability of such small, portable, and, above all, affordable
computers would bring the power of electronic computing, heretofore

90
91

See Pocket Computer May Replace Shopping List, NY Times 23 (Nov 3, 1962).
See id.
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the exclusive province of governments and corporations, into the lives
of the ordinary individual. Within a decade or so, Mauchly predicted,
“everyone would have his own computer” and would mobilize that
computing power for purposes previously unimaginable. For example,
a housewife equipped with one of these “pocket computers” could use
it not only to maintain her household inventory but also to order
goods electronically. “Taking her computer from her handbag,” she
could connect it directly to a communications kiosk at her local
grocery store. Once the store’s computer network had verified her
identify and authorized the charge against her “universal checking
account,” everything she needed for the coming week would be
determined automatically, packaged, and made immediately available
92
for pickup or delivery.
Mauchly’s vision of the empowering potential of the “pocket
computer” seems to us today remarkably prescient, encompassing
elements of both the personal computer and the Internet. But
Mauchly was not alone, even in the early 1960s, in imagining the
revolutionary potential of a truly personal computer. The very first
popular treatment of electronic computers, Edmund Berkeley’s 1948
Giant Brains; or, Machines That Think, had described a relatively
simple home computer (called “Simon”) that could be built for about
$500, and by 1955 Berkeley was selling via mail his “Geniac Electronic
Brain Construction Kit,” which allowed hobbyists to build a series of
93
thirty “electronic brains.” Over the course of the 1960s, several
companies, including Heathkit, were marketing do-it-yourself home
computer kits. Some of these, such as the 1967 CT-650 (the so-called
“paperclip computer”) were probably too simplistic to be much use to
anyone; others, such as the 1965 Honeywell Model 316 Kitchen
Computer, available for purchase from the Neiman Marcus catalog,
was perhaps a little too far ahead of its time: although the Model 316
was surprisingly sophisticated (it shipped, fully assembled and
functional, with an unheard of 4 kB of RAM), it also cost $10,600.
By the middle of the 1970s, there were multiple microcomputer
systems available for purchase in the United States, including both
relatively inexpensive machines such as the Kenbak I ($750) as well as
high-end equipment like the Hewlett-Packard 9380A ($5,075), which
shipped not only with a version of the BASIC programming language
94
but also, for an additional $5,870, a 2.5 MB hard drive. By 1975, even
92

See id.
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the stodgy old IBM Corporation had developed a portable desktop
computer, the IBM 5100, which included a screen, a tape drive, and a
95
keyboard—all packaged in a handy suitcase-like carrying case. That
same year witnessed the launch of Byte magazine, one of several new
96
publications devoted to the burgeoning microcomputer industry. For
the most part, this was an industry that catered either to existing
computer users (in this period, mostly businesses) or amateur
enthusiasts. Nevertheless, it is clear that by the early 1970s, at least,
that Mauchly’s imagined “personal computer” was well on its way to
becoming a reality.
B.

The Altair 8800, the Apple II, and the Two Steves

The existence of such early examples of commercially available
microcomputers challenges conventional narratives about the
“invention” of the modern personal computer. Most popular histories
of computing are dominated by just two moments of invention: the
MITS Altair 8800 (1975) and the Apple II (1977). The Altair 8800 is
often represented as the first “real” microcomputer, and the Apple II
97
as the first commercially viable “home computer.” The mythology
surrounding these two machines—and the small but select group of
celebrity inventors and entrepreneurs most associated with their
development—has so eclipsed all other innovations as to make them
98
effectively invisible. But while both machines are important (albeit
not necessarily for the reasons typically given in the conventional
narratives), it is misleading to use them as guides to the overall
development of an entire industry.
The Altair 8800 was one of the more successful of the early
microcomputer kits (although, as we have seen, by no means the first)
and was influential in that it helped establish one of the first standard
industry architectures (the S-100 bus). More importantly, it was the
machine that first attracted the attention of Harvard sophomore Bill
99
Gates and his boyhood friend Paul Allen. In what has become one of
the best-known and most defining success stories of the modern era,
the mere existence of the Altair 8800 so inspired Gates and Allen that
www.hpmemory.org/wb_pages/wall_b_page_08.htm (visited Aug 17, 2011); Hewlett-Packard HP
9830 Calculator/Computer (Jan 6, 2010), online at http://www.hp9830.com/ (visited Aug 17, 2011).
95 Frank G. Soltis, Fortress Rochester: The Inside Story of the IBM iSeries 382 (29th Street
Press 2001).
96 Paul Freiberger and Michael Swaine, Fire in the Valley: The Making of the Personal
Computer 213–23 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed 2000).
97 Robert X. Cringely, Accidental Empires: How the Boys of Silicon Valley Make Their
Millions, Battle Foreign Competition, and Still Can’t Get a Date 61–62 (HarperBusiness 1996).
98 For a typical example, see id at 61–64, 75.
99 See id at 52.

1660

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:1627

the former quit school and the latter his job, and both moved to
Albuquerque to found a company called Micro-Soft (as their
company was then called). The company’s first product was a version
100
of the BASIC computer language written specifically for the Altair.
The rest, as they say, is history.
The Apple II, as the name implies, was the second version of a
computer developed by another pair of boyhood friends, the
legendary Two Steves: Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs. In 1976 the Two
Steves, along with another friend, Ronald Wayne, started a company
101
to sell a microcomputer kit developed by Wozniak. Within another
year, the company had incorporated, attracted venture capital, and
launched the Apple II, a well-designed, consumer friendly
102
microcomputer. Although Apple Computer was actually only one of
several firms marketing mass-market microcomputers in this period, it
was by far the most visible, and Wozniak and Jobs quickly emerged as
the symbol not only of a new kind of company—the high-tech
personal computer start-up firm—but also of a new kind of computing
culture: hip, empowering, and open (pp 273–74). In the conventional
mythology, Jobs provided the countercultural credibility and charisma,
“the Woz” the technical expertise.
Wu relies on this mythology to illustrate the shift from openness to
control in the personal computer industry. According to his account, it
was the Apple II computer, and the Apple II exclusively, that came to
define the meaning of the modern personal computer and its
subsequent implications for society. As he tells the story, in its early
years, Apple Computer was the “original revolutionary, the
protocountercultural firm that pioneered personal computing” (p 270).
What made Apple different, according to Wu, was Steve Wozniak’s
commitment to radical openness, to the personal computer as “a benefit
to humanity—a tool that would lead to social justice” (p 275). In Wu’s
interpretation, Wozniak embedded these values into the design of the
personal computer, forever establishing openness as the true essence of
the spirit of personal computing. Unlike the machines of its competitors,
the Apple II was built with an “open architecture,” which meant that
users were encouraged to open it up and “tinker with the innards, to
soup it up, make it faster, add features, whatever” (p 276). Whereas its
competitors were simply building computers, Apple was “the first
100

See id at 52–55.
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company to bring open computing, then merely an ideological
commitment, to mass production and popular use” (p 270).
But just as an apple brought down the original paradise, so too
did this Apple contain the seeds of its own destruction. Where Steve
Wozniak was committed to openness, his partner Steve Jobs was
obsessed with aesthetic purity. Where Woz’s Apple II was designed to
be open and expandable, Jobs’s Macintosh was closed and controlled.
Although innovative in certain respects (particularly its incorporation
of the graphical user interface and the “mouse” pointing device), the
Macintosh was, according to Wu, also “completely retrograde” (p 277).
In choosing elegant design over user accessibility, Jobs had “elected
the design principles that had governed the Hollywood Studios,
Theodore Vail’s AT&T, indeed anyone who had ever dreamed of a
perfect system” (p 277). In Wu’s parable of the Two Steves, the
essential nature of the personal computer (open, organic, userfriendly) is corrupted by the cold beauty of the closed, impersonal
system. As Steve Jobs assumed more and more control of Apple
Computer, he would “repudiate, decisively and forever,” Steve
Wozniak’s original vision of personal empowerment through
technology (p 291). With the introduction of the iPod, iPhone, and
iPad, Jobs completed his usurpation of the potential of the personal
computer. These devices, according to Wu, constituted the culmination
of Jobs’s desire for “perfect control over product and consumer”
(p 291). While they might at first appear to be user-friendly, they are in
fact designed specifically to be “Hollywood-friendly.” With obvious
approval, Wu repeats the dire prediction of Tom Conlon, a columnist
at Popular Science: “Once we replace the personal computer with a
closed-platform device such as the iPad, we replace freedom, choice
and the free market with oppression, censorship and monopoly”
(p 293). A more perfect encapsulation of Wu’s larger cyclical model of
history can hardly be imagined.
The primary source for Wu’s pocket history of the personal
103
computer is Wozniak’s own recent memoir, iWoz. But while personal
recollections make for interesting reading, they are rarely reliable
historical sources. In order to fit his model to the relevant history, Wu
has to be carefully selective. Missing is the long prehistory of the
personal computer, from Mauchly’s original coinage through the early
microcomputers of the mid-to-late 1960s to the early attempts to
commercialize the technology in the 1970s. Almost completely ignored
are Apple’s competitors, many of whom had market shares almost as
large as Apple’s, even in Apple’s heyday of the late 1970s and early
103

See generally Wozniak, iWoz (cited in note 101).
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1980s. Microsoft and IBM appear only, and curiously, as the spiritual
successors to Wozniak’s ideal of openness. No mention is made at all of
many of the other great contributors to the history of the personal
computer, many of whose goals and agendas do not fit neatly into Wu’s
simplistic open-versus-closed dichotomy. Even the history of Apple
itself is curiously truncated: We know (perhaps) what cofounders Steve
Jobs and Steve Wozniak believed in what they were doing, but what
about Apple president and CEO Michael Scott, or key investors such as
the former Intel executive Mike Markkula (who would soon become
Apple’s second CEO) or venture capitalist Arthur Rock—not to
mention the other Apple engineers, marketing executives, sales
specialists, and users? To what degree were they willing to compromise
openness for usability or simplicity or some other virtue?
How would the historical picture look if we incorporated a richer,
more nuanced, more diverse set of perspectives? To begin with, it
might be difficult to define who exactly “invented” the personal
computer. Was it Berkeley or Mauchly, who both at least imagined its
existence? Or the early microcomputer kit manufacturers who built
actual, working machinery? Or does the claim to have truly invented a
product require that the product possess a certain level of
sophistication? These questions matter not so much in terms of
establishing priority (like almost every significant technological
innovation, the personal computer is the product of many
contributors, and so fine-grained distinctions about who was first are
seldom productive or interesting) but rather in that they complicate
any interpretation of the “essential character” of any given technology.
There were amateur enthusiasts, like Steve Wozniak, for whom the
personal computer was more a toy with which to tinker than a tool for
accomplishing some other activity. But there were also others whose
104
interest was always primarily commercial. Some aspects of the early
microcomputer systems were open; others were closed. In fact, it
might be argued that it is the unresolved tension between the two that
proves most productive for the industry: the technology had to be
open enough to encourage peripheral innovation but closed enough to
allow for consistency, control, and profitability.
The case of the Altair 8800 is illuminative in this respect. The Altair
was not the first, the least expensive, or the most powerful of the
microcomputer kits available in the mid-1970s. Like many of these buildit-yourself kits, it was built around the Intel 8080 microprocessor, which
was designed for and marketed specifically to microcomputer
104 See Cringely, Accidental Empires at 184 (cited in note 97); Wozniak, iWoz at 194–95
(cited in note 101).
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manufacturers. From the point of view of these manufacturers, the Intel
8080 was a commodity technology: combined with a set of related control
chips (also provided, and heavily marketed, by Intel), almost any
company with expertise in electronics could assemble a microcomputer
105
kit. In this sense, the Intel architecture was open. The only unique
contribution of MITS, the manufacturer of the Altair, was the S-100 bus,
which provided expansion slots into which other peripheral devices could
be easily inserted. The S-100 bus became one of the first industry
106
standard architectures, representing yet another degree of openness.
This openness was not ideological, but rather practical. In order to put
together its kit quickly and inexpensively, MITS had to build in the ability
for future upgrades. In its stock configuration, the Altair 8800 could not
107
actually do very much. Getting it to do anything interesting required
memory upgrades, peripheral devices such as screens and keyboards, and
software applications. The S-100 bus allowed the Altair 8800 to be
108
expandable. The extent to which it also made the Altair architecture
“open” was entirely unintentional and, from the point of view of MITS at
least, undesirable. Like many innovators who designed architectures
which were a little too open, MITS was soon forced out of the market it
had helped create by competitors leveraging the widespread availability
of peripherals designed for the S-100 bus and software developed for the
Intel 8080 microprocessor. The only long-term survivor of the cutthroat
competition created by the S-100 clones was the one company who
aggressively protected as proprietary its contribution to the otherwise
open ecosystem: in a now legendary “open letter” to computer hobbyists,
Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates famously decried the deplorable
109
tendency among hobbyists to share their software. While the Altair
BASIC language that Microsoft developed was “open” in the sense that
it could be used to create and expand the overall system, it was itself
closed off to the public.
The ready availability of sophisticated microprocessors like the
Intel 8080, Motorola 6800, and MOS Technologies 6502 created the
conditions for rapid expansion within the microcomputer industry in
the mid-to-late 1970s. That these were the products of large,
105 See Ross K. Bassett, To the Digital Age: Research Labs, Start-Up Companies, and the Rise
of MOS Technology 278–79 (Johns Hopkins 2002).
106 Cringely, Accidental Empires at 276 (cited in note 97) (describing the “hundreds” of
S-100 circuit cards circulating in the burgeoning computer market compatible with multiple
machines).
107 See id at 53.
108 See id at 136–37 (describing the bus technology as unprofitable because it was
“published and available to any manufacturer who wanted to implement it”).
109 See Bill Gates, An Open Letter to Hobbyists (Feb 3, 1976), online at http://upload.wikimedia.org
/wikipedia/commons/1/14/Bill_Gates_Letter_to_Hobbyists.jpg (visited Aug 7, 2011).
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traditional, and often defense-oriented firms is generally omitted from
the conventional hippy- and hacker-focused origins stories of the
personal computer. Within a few years, dozens (if not hundreds) of
microcomputer companies had emerged to capitalize on this emerging
market. Of these, Apple was arguably the most visible, although Tandy
Radio Shack and Commodore International were comparable in
110
terms of both technology and market share. It is not at all clear that
it was the Apple II that primarily defined for the public what a
personal computer was and should be, much less that “openness” was
a computer’s most important feature. The Commodore 64, introduced
in 1982, remains the best selling computer of all time. More than
111
seventeen million were sold worldwide. And yet the Commodore 64
112
was not an open architecture machine.
Even the Apple II was only “open” in limited ways. Like the
Altair 8800, it was designed with expansion slots to encourage
113
peripheral development. This was a common design strategy for
computer manufacturers: the goal was to encourage network effects
and to establish your platform as the key element of an overall
technology ecosystem. Those elements of the system that Apple
wanted and needed to control, such as the Apple system software, it
kept proprietary. In 1982, for example, it sued the Franklin Computer
Company, which had created an Apple II clone, for copyright
114
infringement. It is not clear that Apple was ever open in the sense
that Wu and Wozniak imply; it was certainly not open in the modern
usage established by the open source software movement.
C.

IBM as the Paragon of Openness

In any case, the one computer manufacturer that might plausibly
claim to have firmly established the personal computer industry was not
Apple, Tandy Radio Shack, or Commodore, but rather the IBM
110 Joanna Stavins, Estimating Demand Elasticities in a Differentiated Product Industry: The
Personal Computer Market *23 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper Series, July
1995), online at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp1995/wp95_9.pdf (visited Aug 17, 2011)
(showing that Radio Shack, Commodore, and Apple were the three largest firms in the personal
computer industry in the late 1970s).
111 Nick Bilton, The New Commodore 64, Updated with Its Old Exterior, NY Times Bits
Blog (Apr 6, 2011), online at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/the-new-commodore-64updated-with-its-old-exterior/ (visited Aug 17, 2011). See also Richards and Alderman, Core
Memory at 141 (cited in 94).
112 Daniel Terdiman, Silicon Valley Celebrates Commodore 64 at 25, CNET News (Dec 10,
2007), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-9832182-52.html (visited Aug 17, 2011).
113 See Cringely, Accidental Empires at 136 (cited in note 97) (noting that Wozniak created
“a scheme for adding special function cards to the Apple II”).
114 Apple Computer, Inc v Franklin Computer Corp, 545 F Supp 812 (ED Pa 1982), revd
714 F2d 1240 (3d Cir 1983). See also Wozniak, iWoz at 220–21 (cited in note 101).
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Corporation. What IBM did for the personal computer industry was to
establish a single, industry-wide architecture. Some elements of this
architecture were open, others aggressively closed. What is important is
not whether it was open or closed but simply that it was standard. And
to a certain extent, all standards are closed. They limit certain kinds of
innovation and enable others. Within a few years of its introduction, the
IBM-Microsoft-Intel architecture killed off almost all of its competitors
(pp 278–79). In doing so, it allowed software developers and peripheral
manufacturers to focus all their attention on a single dominant
ecosystem. The result was an explosion of investment and innovation in
the personal computer industry. Within unity, diversity.
Wu acknowledges the role of the IBM-Microsoft-Intel architecture
in bringing about a mass-market revolution in personal computing, but
his characterization of this architecture as being “open” is inconsistent.
It is true that IBM constructed its early personal computers around
widely available components, such as the Intel 8086 microprocessor. In
fact, this decision helped contribute to IBM’s eventual downfall as a
personal computer manufacturer, as other manufacturers could also
115
easily purchase identical equipment. But one key element of the IBM
system, the Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS DOS), did remain
tightly controlled. True, it remained controlled by Microsoft, not IBM,
but controlled nonetheless. Microsoft gladly licensed their system to
116
IBM clone manufacturers, which ultimately made IBM irrelevant. But
there was nothing open about the Microsoft operating system. Once
again, we see that elements of the system can be made open while
others remain proprietary. These are not primarily ideological positions;
they are commercial strategies. It is true that in certain technologies, in
specific historical periods, the balance between open and closed can
become upset. It is not at all obvious, however, that the history of either
the personal computer or the Internet illustrates a clear or inevitable
trajectory from open to closed. The reality is much more complicated.
The point of all this is not to quibble over historical details. Such
disputes are generally of interest only to specialist historians, industry
insiders, and patent lawyers. But when historical case studies are used
to develop sweeping arguments about important social issues and
policy concerns, it is important that we get the facts straight. There are,
astonishingly, almost no rigorous historical treatments of the personal
computer industry. The literature is so dominated by the wonderfully
compelling life stories of fabulously rich computing celebrities that it

115

See Cringely, Accidental Empires at 136–37, 171–81 (cited in note 97).
Henry W. Chesbrough and David J. Teece, Organizing for Innovation: When Is Virtual
Virtuous?, 74 Harv Bus Rev 65, 69–70 (Jan–Feb 1996).
116
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is difficult for more staid, academic histories to compete. More
significantly, it is clear from the solid histories that do exist that the
true story of the personal computer revolution is exceedingly
complicated and involves a wide range of actors, including not just
inventors but manufacturers, marketers, developers, users, educators,
and content providers as well. There is more to this story than just
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak.
D. AOL–Time Warner
Of all the stories that Wu recounts, the one that is the hardest to
fit into his narrative is the epic failure of the AOL–Time Warner
merger, which he candidly terms “A Surprising Wreck” (p 257). At the
time, many observers thought of the combination of the largest dial-up
Internet service provider (ISP) (which was also the leading provider
of proprietary content) with a firm that represented the second-largest
cable operator (which was also the largest broadband ISP and the
holder of a vast film library) as something akin to the end of history.
As it turned out, it was simply the end of approximately $200 billion in
Time Warner shareholder value.
So what derailed this would-be juggernaut combination of content
and conduit? Although Wu acknowledges the problems caused by the
clash of corporate cultures, he assigns primary responsibility to the
irrepressible force of the Internet (pp 260, 265–66, 268). Once end users
were freed to serve as their own guides in finding content, the walled
garden that AOL tried to preserve did not stand a chance.
Somewhat strangely, Wu takes little comfort from this story,
rejecting the exceptionalist position that the Internet is inherently
different (pp 5, 14, 317). Indeed, he harbors great concern that some
corporate interest will attempt and succeed where AOL failed (pp 7,
14, 285–86, 290, 296, 317–18). And yet, these concerns remain quite
amorphous without any clear explanation of why Wu thinks that a
later effort might be more successful in altering the Internet’s open
architecture than was AOL’s.
Another plausible explanation is that AOL and the entire dial-up
ISP model were undone not by openness but rather by the Internet’s
shift from narrowband transmission via dial-up modems to broadband
transmission. In the narrowband world, in which end users employ
telephone connections to dial into modem banks maintained by ISPs,
the network serves as a mere passthrough. Indeed, the network is
oblivious to whether the connection is carrying a voice call, a fax, or
data communications. All of this changed with the deployment of
broadband connections, such as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and
cable modem systems. Because these systems use the same wire to
carry two different streams (video combined with data in the case of
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cable modem systems and voice combined with data in the case of
DSL), both types of providers must maintain equipment in their
central facilities to separate the streams as well as a data network
within the facility to hold the traffic emerging from the data
connection until it can be routed toward its ultimate destination. Thus
a broadband network provider no longer serves as a mere
passthrough. Instead, it must necessarily perform a number of
functions previously provided by ISPs. When that is the case, the
incremental cost to establish a direct connection to a backbone access
point is trivial, and it makes little sense for the network provider to
rely on an ISP for services that a broadband network can provide
117
more cheaply itself.
AOL was thus undone not by the Internet’s architecture but
rather by the technological collapse of the interface on which the dialup ISP business model was based. Interestingly, since Time Warner
was the largest broadband network provider at the time, AOL might
have been able to survive had it converted itself into the homepage
for Time Warner’s portal services. Ironically, as Wu notes, it was
prevented from displacing the incumbent proprietary portal service
(known as Road Runner) by merger conditions imposed by the
Federal Trade Commission (p 265).
***
In short, framing the computer industry in terms of an intramural
dispute within Apple does not fairly capture the relevant history. Not
only does it overstate the extent to which the Apple II was in fact open,
it also exaggerates the importance of the Apple by ignoring the wide
range of other early microcomputers, many of which were far more
successful than the Apple II and which reveal a vibrant market-based
competition between open and closed strategies. Furthermore,
architectural outcomes were driven more by technical considerations
(such as occurred with the Altair 8800) or legal restrictions (as was the
case with the AOL–Time Warner merger) rather than by a principled
precommitment to openness. Only by truncating the account of these
events can the history be made to fit the mogul-driven vision of the
Cycle that is the central driver of the book.

117 See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Broadband Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J Telecomm & High Tech
L 23, 33–34 (2004).
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V. TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE FORCES DRIVING
THE CYCLE
A more comprehensive account of the histories of the telephone,
radio, television, film, and computer industries reveals patterns of
interactions between forces that are much more complex than
suggested by the more streamlined account presented in The Master
Switch. Far from being a problem, these variations in the patterns of
industry evolution are invitations for further analysis that hold
considerable promise for providing a richer understanding of the
forces shaping emerging communications technologies.
A. Different Theoretical Conceptions of the Cycle
Wu argues that information industries pass through a life cycle
that transitions from open to closed and eventually back to open, with
openness and closedness measured largely in terms of vertical
integration (pp 130, 147, 305–06, 311). As noted earlier, Wu views the
Cycle as being driven by corporate moguls attempting to reassert
dominance (p 10).
This argument fits into a long tradition of theories exploring how
the degree of vertical integration varies over the course of an
industry’s life cycle. The best-known theory was offered by Nobel
laureate George Stigler. Stigler argued that vertical integration in an
industry follows a “U” shape over time, beginning as vertically
integrated, transitioning to vertically disintegrated as the industry
matures, and then returning once again to vertically integrated as the
industry declines. Because young industries often employ new
materials and technologies that are typically unavailable on the open
market, firms operating in these industries must produce all of their
key inputs themselves. As demand for the product becomes better
established, production becomes sufficiently large, and risk drops to
the point where third parties have strong incentives to begin providing
these inputs. When the industry enters its decline phase, the decline in
sales volume causes third-party input providers to disappear, and
firms operating in this industry must once again provide these inputs
118
for themselves. A literature has emerged assessing Stigler’s life cycle
119
theory of vertical integration empirically.
118 George Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J Pol
Econ 185, 190 (1951).
119 For empirical studies validating Stigler’s theory, see Irvin B. Tucker and Ronald P.
Wilder, Trends in Vertical Integration in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 26 J Indus Econ 81, 92
(1977); David Levy, Testing Stigler’s Interpretation of “The Division of Labor Is Limited by the
Extent of the Market,” 32 J Indus Econ 377, 387 (1984); James M. MacDonald, Market Exchange
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Many eminent scholars have identified similar patterns in media
industries. Ithiel de Sola Pool notes that during the first generation of
broadcast radio stations, “broadcasters themselves had to take
120
responsibility for putting on programs.” Bruce Owen and Gregory
Rosston similarly observe that because “[i]ndependent programmers did
not come forward in sufficient numbers” to meet cable’s burgeoning
demand for programming, cable operators had to self-finance the initial
121
generation of cable programming. Alfred Kahn has expressed similar
122
views. The history of the cable industry provides a particularly dramatic
123
demonstration of this dynamic. In 1990, 50 percent of all cable networks
and thirteen of the top fifteen cable networks by viewership (87 percent)
124
were vertically integrated. By 2009, these numbers had dropped
precipitously, with only 6 percent of all cable networks and two of the top
or Vertical Integration: An Empirical Analysis, 67 Rev Econ & Stat 327, 387 (1985); Harold
Demsetz, Vertical Integration: Theories and Evidence, in Harold Demsetz, ed, 1 Ownership, Control,
and the Firm: The Organization of Economic Activity 166, 166–86 (Basil Blackwell 1988).
For empirical studies drawing the contrary conclusion, see J.A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration
and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry 21–95 (Harvard 1983); Kathryn Rudie Harrigan,
Vertical Integration and Corporate Strategy, 28 Acad Mgmt J 397, 424 (1985); Mike Wright and
Steve Thompson, Vertical Disintegration and the Life-Cycle of Firms and Industries, 7 Managerial
& Decis Econ 141, 143 (1986).
120 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 35 (Belknap 1983). See also Howard A.
Shelanski, The Bending Line between “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 Colum L Rev 1048,
1054 (1997) (“RCA appeared to have been correct that broadcast licensees would themselves have
to develop programming to stimulate a market sufficient to attract sponsors or purchasers of air
time—i.e., as Harold Power told J.P. Morgan in 1915, “‘[t]o get broadcasting started, you have to
start broadcasting.”), citing Barnouw, 1 A History of Broadcasting at 36 (cited in note 65).
121 Bruce M. Owen and Gregory L. Rosston, Local Broadband Access: Primum Non Nocere
or Primum Processi? A Property Rights Approach, in Thomas M. Lenard and Randolph J. May,
eds, Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet Services Be Regulated? 163,
164–65 (Springer 2006). In so doing, Bruce Owen disclaimed his previous support for treating
cable operators as common carriers. See Bruce M. Owen, Public Policy and Emerging
Technology in the Media, 18 Pub Pol 539, 546, 551 (1970).
122 Alfred E. Kahn, A Democratic Voice of Caution on Net Neutrality 3, Progress Snapshot,
Release
2.24
(Oct
2006),
online
at
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2006
/ps2.24voiceofcautiononnetneutrality.pdf (visited Aug 13, 2011) (abandoning his previous
support for treating cable operators as common carriers out of recognition that vertical
integration into programming created “public benefits from the especial incentives of the several
broadcasters to produce programming of their own”). For Kahn’s earlier advocacy of regulating
cable operators as common carriers, see Kahn, 2 The Economics of Regulation at 35–43 & n 114
(cited in note 45).
123 For an analysis of the data between 1990 and 2001, see Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical
Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 Yale J Reg 171, 231 & table v (2002).
For an analysis updating this data through 2009, see Christopher S. Yoo, Comments of
Christopher S. Yoo, Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc, for Consent to Assign Licenses or Transfer Control of Licenses, 29–30 &
figures 10–11 (2010), online at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020472619 (visited
Aug 13, 2011).
124 See Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission’s Policies Relating to the
Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 FCC Rcd 4962, 5109–14 tables 4–5, 7–8 (1990).
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fifteen cable networks by viewership (13 percent) being vertically
125
integrated. Other examples include the fact that Apple relied on its
proprietary software provider Claris to produce the first generation of
126
software for the Macintosh. Indeed, industries that require the
simultaneous development of complementary products often rely on a
127
single, vertically integrated player to get both sides on board.
Interestingly, this vision of the typical industry life cycle follows
the opposite pattern as the one Wu proposes. Even more importantly,
Stigler’s life cycle is driven by different forces. Instead of hegemonic
business strategy driven by corporate moguls, Stigler’s version is the
result of the size of the underlying market.
Clayton Christensen, who Wu cites favorably to support other
128
propositions, offers a theory of vertical integration that follows a
similar pattern but for somewhat different reasons. During an industry’s
early stages, firms compete by offering greater product functionality. At
that time, the interdependency of production functions, the need to stay
at the cutting edge of the technological frontier, and the need for
unstructured technical dialogue leads them to prefer vertically
129
integrated firm structures. Eventually, market leaders push the level of
product improvement past what customers can utilize, at which point
the basis for competition shifts to other factors, such as speed to market
and customization. This represents a different type of competition,
which favors the more vertically disintegrated structure associated with
130
After the benefits provided by these alternative
modularity.
dimensions have been exhausted, competition once again turns to price,

125

See Yoo, Comments of Christopher S. Yoo at 29 figure 10 (cited in note 123).
Claris Corporation, Presenting Claris 1.0, InfoWorld S8–S9 (Sept 26, 1988)
(advertisement).
127 See Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition among
Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J Econ 309, 310–11, 322–23 (2003); Jean-Charles
Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J Eur Econ Assn 990, 990,
1013, 1018 (2003).
128 Wu cites Christensen’s work for the idea of disruptive innovation, defined in the book as
innovations that “threaten[] to displace a product altogether,” pointing to the example of the
typewriter’s replacement by the word processor (p 20). This broad generalization is not quite
faithful to Christensen’s very specific conception of disruptive technologies, which arise when
established firms commit to pushing the technological ceiling above what consumers actually
need. This leaves the door open for new entrants offering products that are clearly
technologically inferior but are a better fit with what consumers actually need and are willing to
pay for. See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause
Great Firms to Fail xv (Harvard Business 1997). To Christensen, then, disruptive innovation is
not an attack by a superior technology from above. It is an attack by an inferior technology from
below. Id at 165.
129 See Clayton M. Christensen, Matt Verlinden, and George Westerman, Disruption,
Disintegration, and the Dissipation of Differentiability, 11 Indust & Corp Change 955, 962–63 (2002).
130 See id at 963–64.
126
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which refocuses firms on the cost minimization made possible by
131
vertical integration. Under Christensen’s theory, the mechanism
driving the level of vertical integration is the relative pace of product
innovation and consumers’ ability to absorb those changes, rather than
the level of specialization permitted by the size of the market.
Other technology-focused life cycle theories draw very different
132
conclusions. For example, the “dominant design” theory pioneered by
William Abernathy and James Utterback posits that when a new
industry first emerges, the uncertainty surrounding which particular
configuration of technologies will best serve consumers’ needs
discourages specialization in production and gives advantages to those
133
who keep their production processes flexible. Once the industry
coalesces around a dominant design, price competition intensifies, and
the market becomes stable enough to provide incentives to investing in
134
more specialized production processes. Many scholars assumed that
the desire for greater control over production processes once a
dominant design has emerged would lead to greater vertical
135
integration. Later scholars recognized that firms could accomplish the
same objectives through contracts establishing long-term partnerships
with suppliers and distributors instead of through formal vertical
136
integration. This pattern would continue until a major change in
technology, market demand, or government regulation caused the
market to undergo “dematurity,” at which point the cycle begins once
137
again. Other scholars have refined the analysis still further, suggesting
that the life cycle is more likely to be restarted by innovations that
destroy the know-how embodied in the existing technological

131

See id at 963 n 7.
For a survey of life cycle theories and their policy implications for the Internet, see
Christopher S. Yoo, Product Life Cycle Theory and the Maturation of the Internet, 104 Nw U L
Rev 641, 666–67 (2010).
133 See James M. Utterback and William J. Abernathy, A Dynamic Model of Process and
Product Innovation, 3 Omega Intl J Mgmt Sci 639, 643–44 (1975).
134 See William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback, Patterns of Industrial Innovation,
80 Tech Rev 47, 41, 44 (June–July 1978).
135 See James M. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How Companies Can
Seize Opportunities in the Face of Technological Change 90 (Harvard 1994); James M. Utterback
and Fernando F. Suárez, Innovation, Competition, and Industry Structure, 22 Rsrch Pol 1, 4 (1993)
(observing that Abernathy and Utterback considered vertical integration to be an “inevitable
outcome of technological evolution in an industry”).
136 See Utterback and Suárez, 22 Rsrch Pol at 4, 18 (cited in note 135).
137 See William J. Abernathy, Kim B. Clark, and Alan M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance:
Producing a Competitive Future for America 21, 109 (Basic Books 1983); William J. Abernathy
and Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction, 14 Rsrch Pol 3, 18
(1985); Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation at 158–65 (cited in note 135).
132
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138

paradigm and challenge the linkages between the existing paradigm’s
139
core technological concepts.
In contrast to the models advanced by Stigler and Christensen, the
overall pattern of vertical integration and renewal associated with
dominant design theory is more consonant with the Cycle Wu envisions.
Dominant design theory does differ in one important respect, however.
The life cycle is driven not by the ambitions of moguls or by corporate
strategy but rather by the inexorable force of the underlying
technology. As was the case with Stigler’s theory, the empirical
140
literature testing dominant design theory is somewhat mixed.
Stigler’s model also drew criticism from another Nobel laureate,
Oliver Williamson, who suggested that vertical integration was more
the result of opportunistic behavior and transaction costs than sales
141
growth. Consistent with this insight, David Teece developed a theory
of industry life cycles that combines transaction cost considerations
with dominant design theory. Most innovations are not stand-alone
products; instead, they usually must be combined with other inputs in
142
order to become marketable to consumers. During an industry’s
initial stages, when firms are struggling to identify the optimal product
143
design, control of these other inputs does not play a significant role.
Once the dominant design has emerged, however, the innovator’s
success turns as much on its bargaining power vis-à-vis the providers
of these other inputs as it does on the value provided by its own
contributions. If the innovator has to make relationship-specific
investments, it will be vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behavior by
144
the providers of these other inputs. The classic solution to this
problem is to use long-term contracts to enter into a strategic

138 See Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson, Technological Discontinuities and
Organizational Environments, 31 Admin Sci Q 439, 442, 460 (1986).
139 See Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration
of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 Admin Sci Q 9, 13–14 (1990).
140 See Steven Klepper, Industry Life Cycles, 6 Indust & Corp Change 145, 159, 164 (1997)
(finding that although the auto industry exhibited greater vertical integration as it matured, six
other industries did not follow any consistent pattern of vertical integration). For reviews of the
empirical literature on dominant designs, see Johann Peter Murmann and Koen Frenken, Toward
a Systematic Framework for Research on Dominant Designs, Technological Innovations, and
Industrial Change, 35 Rsrch Pol 925, 926–30 (2006); Fernando F. Suarez, Battles for Technological
Dominance: An Integrative Framework, 33 Rsrch Pol 271, 272–73 (2004).
141 Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 16–19
(Free Press 1975).
142 David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 Rsrch Pol 285, 288 (1986).
143 See id at 291.
144 See id at 292.
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partnership or, if the costs of external contracting and monitoring
145
exceed the costs of internal governance, to vertically integrate.
Thus, transaction-cost theory also supports a pattern of vertical
integration similar to the one Wu predicts. As was the case with
dominant design theory, however, the dynamic driving this life cycle
(minimization of transaction costs) is quite different from the one Wu
envisions.
The theoretical literature thus exhibits a wide range of views
regarding the forces causing the patterns of vertical integration within
an industry to change over time. Indeed, in the historical episodes that
Wu describes, key turning points are the result of a variety of factors,
including the ambitions of industry moguls, patents, antitrust
enforcement, and intellectual movements, many of which do not fit
easily into a single conception of the Cycle. Instead, they invite closer
analysis of how these episodes fit within the theoretical literature, an
exercise that would help shed light on how market demand,
technological change, and corporate ambitions can cause industries to
shift between open and closed structures. Indeed, these differences
provide the variation needed to evaluate the relative merits of the
various hypotheses.
B.

The Impact of Advertising and Market Structure on Content

Another area that receives little exploration is the role of
advertising. Although the book discusses the radio industry’s early
opposition and later acceptance of advertising as a primary source of
revenue (pp 74–77), it does not analyze the structural implications of
advertising support or the role of advertisers as rivals for control. For
example, radio networks often sold blocks of time to advertisers, who
146
then hired advertising agencies to produce programs for these slots.
This in effect forced networks to surrender control over their own
schedules to advertisers, a fact that gave sponsors tremendous control
over industry behavior. Advertisers thus represented important industry
players who often served as important counterweights to Sarnoff.
147
Reliance on advertising support has several other structural effects.
For example, it introduces an intermediary into the relationship between
programmers and viewers. As a result, programming is likely to be
influenced more by programs’ impact on consumers’ willingness to buy

145

See id at 293–94.
See Barnouw, 1 A History of Broadcasting at 156–59 (cited in note 65).
147 See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 Emory
L J 1579, 1677–82 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S Cal L
Rev 669, 681–85 (2005).
146
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advertised products than by audiences’ desire to see particular
148
programming.
Furthermore, advertising support limits consumers’ ability to signal
the intensity of their preferences in much the same way as voting regimes.
As an initial matter, advertising revenue provides only an indirect signal
of the value that listeners and viewers place on the underlying
149
programs. Moreover, unlike pricing regimes, in which audiences can
signal particularly strong preferences by paying more for programming,
advertising support gives consumers only one way to signal the intensity
150
of their preferences: viewing versus nonviewing. As a result, advertising
responsiveness is generally regarded as understating the value that
151
audiences place on those programs. The result is a reduction in the
resources invested in program quality. At the same time, reliance on
advertising support reduces the diversity of programming by increasing
152
the break-even audience size that programming needs to survive.
These insights undercut the sharp distinction that Wu attempts to
draw between these historical episodes’ impact on industry economics
and their impact on the nature and quality of the content being
created (pp 97, 303–05). By affecting the economics, these industry
practices directly affect the quality and diversity of content being
conveyed. In short, these practices and the quality and quantity of
speech are inexorably linked.
Consider block booking, which Wu notes may be economically
beneficial (p 96). (This debate remains ongoing, particularly in the
modern context of allowing cable subscribers to select channels á la
carte.) Beyond the works that Wu cites, there is a long scholarly
tradition showing how bundling content from the same provider can
153
promote economic welfare, either by allowing excess consumer
surplus enjoyed by one consumer with respect to one product to fund

148 See C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press 48, 54–56, 62–66 (Princeton
1994); C. Edwin Baker, Media, Markets, and Democracy 24–30 (Cambridge 2002); Cass R.
Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 63–65 (Free Press 1993).
149 See Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J L &
Econ 71, 75 (1964).
150 See id; Michael Spence and Bruce Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic
Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q J Econ 103, 112 & n 12 (1977).
151 See Roger G. Noll, Merton J. Peck, and John J. McGowan, Economic Aspects of
Television Regulation 23 (Brookings 1973) (estimating that advertising support understates
viewer preferences for television programming by a factor of seven). Critics quibble with the
magnitude of the estimate but not its core conclusion. See Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1678 n 336 (cited
in note 147).
152 See Spence and Owen, 91 Q J Econ at 112–13, 122–23 (cited in note 150); Suchan Chae
and Daniel Flores, Broadcasting versus Narrowcasting, 10 Info Econ & Policy 41, 50–51 (1998).
153 See Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1702–12 (cited in note 147).
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154

any shortfalls in another product or by discouraging a single firm
providing many channels from using its additional channels to offer
content that simply cannibalizes audiences from offerings already on
155
the air. Wu nonetheless claims that despite these potential economic
efficiencies, block booking remains problematic because of its adverse
effect on the nature of the content being produced. This argument
disregards the fact that improving economic efficiency can also have a
positive effect on the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming.
Increasing program producers’ ability to appropriate surplus makes it
easier for new films and programs to cover their costs. This favors
special interest programs by enabling them to survive despite the fact
156
that they draw relatively small audiences. This insight draws support
from the fact that a diverse range of cable networks, including CSPAN, Discovery, and a number of networks targeted toward African
Americans, all opposed regulatory efforts to unbundle cable television
157
channels.
Wu also repeats the often-advanced claim that information
industries are more horizontally concentrated than in the 1950s
(pp 255–56). This claim ignores the broader literature suggesting that
158
this is not true empirically. Even more importantly, a rich theoretical
literature exists showing that the relationship between horizontal
159
concentration and program diversity is ambiguous. Some empirical
studies have indicated that increases in horizontal concentration may

154 For the seminal contribution, see generally William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen,
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q J Econ 475 (1976). For other leading
contributions, see Mark Armstrong, Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm, 66 Rev Econ
Stud 151, 152 (1999); Yannis Bakos and Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing,
Profits, and Efficiency, 45 Mgmt Sci 1613, 1614, 1616, 1619 (1999); Michael A. Salinger, A
Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68 J Bus 85, 86, 92–93 (1995); R. Preston McAfee, John
McMillan, and Michael D. Whinston, Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and
Correlation of Values, 104 Q J Econ 371, 372, 377–80 (1989); Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian
Demand and Commodity Pricing, 57 J Bus S211, S228 (1984).
155 For the seminal contribution, see Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences and
the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q J Econ 194, 200 (1952). For other
important contributions, see Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in
Television Markets, 91 Q J Econ 15, 26–33 (1977); Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry
and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting, 30 RAND J Econ 397, 411–14 (1999); Ronald L.
Goettler and Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition in the Network Television Industry, 32 RAND J
Econ 624, 647–48 (2001).
156 See Yoo, 52 Emory L J at 1706–12 (cited in note 147); Thomas W. Hazlett, Shedding Tiers
for A La Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable Pricing, 5 J Telecomm & High Tech L 253,
280–81 (2006).
157 See Hazlett, 5 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 281–83 (cited in note 156).
158 See Eli M. Noam, Media Ownership and Concentration in America ch 13 (Oxford 2009).
159 See Yoo, 78 S Cal L Rev at 693–98 (cited in note 147) (reviewing the literature).
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160

actually improve program diversity, although the FCC found the
empirical support too ambiguous to support a strong policy inference in
161
either direction. Again, in addition to affecting economic welfare,
structural features of the underlying industries have implications for the
162
nature of the content being created. The ambiguity of the empirical
record does not support attributing any simple relationship between
structure and conduct.
But Wu reserves his harshest criticism for vertical integration,
which he claims reduces content diversity and innovation (pp 130, 147,
295, 305–06, 311) and presumes that an open, vertically disintegrated
structure will yield better content (pp 35–39, 72–73, 139–47, 297). At
other times, however, the book concedes that vertical integration may
actually benefit consumers (pp 84, 162, 284 n *, 305, 306), epitomized
by the seamless and high-quality end-user experience offered by
Apple (pp 278, 291–92). Indeed, a vibrant theoretical literature exists
163
identifying ways that vertical integration yields efficiencies. An
164
empirical literature is emerging that explores these conclusions. Yet
Wu concludes that the “Separations Principle” requires that these
benefits be sacrificed (p 305). In the process, Wu also stops short of
undertaking any detailed analysis of the literature exploring the
impact that prohibiting these practices would have on the nature of
media programming. The FCC’s experience with how restrictions on
160 See Steven Berry and Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence
from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q J Econ 1009, 1024 (2001); Augustus E. Grant, The Promise
Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program Diversity on Television, 7 J Media Econ 51, 59, 62
(1994); Robert P. Rogers and John R. Woodbury, Market Structure, Program Diversity, and Radio
Audience Size, 14 Contemp Econ Pol 81, 90 (Jan 1996).
161 See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13742 ¶¶ 312–15 (2003).
162 See Yoo, 78 S Cal L Rev at 693–701 (cited in note 147).
163 For surveys, see id at 706–13; Yoo, 19 Yale J Reg at 213–17, 232–37, 260–65 (cited in
note 123).
164 For studies showing that vertical integration enhances consumer welfare, see Tasneem
Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television
Industry, 91 Am Econ Rev 428, 429 (2001); Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice Model of
Broadcasting, 55 Pub Choice 163, 183 (1987); Michael G. Vita, Must Carry Regulations for Cable
Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J Reg Econ 159, 169 (1997). Other studies were
inconclusive. See, for example, David Waterman and Andrew A. Weiss, The Effects of Vertical
Integration between Cable Television Systems and Pay Cable Networks, 72 J Econometrics 357,
391 (1996). One study found a welfare loss of $0.60 per cable subscriber per year. George S. Ford
and John D. Jackson, Horizontal Concentration and Vertical Integration in the Cable Television
Industry, 12 Rev Indust Org 501, 515–16 (1997). A recent review of the literature conducted by
four members of the Federal Trade Commission staff concluded that vertical integration tended
to be benign or welfare enhancing and described the welfare losses identified by the Ford and
Jackson study (the only study finding that vertical integration reduced welfare) as miniscule.
James C. Cooper, et al, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 Intl J Indust
Org 639, 648 (2005).
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vertical integration in television broadcasting—such as the financial
interest and syndication rules (finsyn) and the Prime Time Access
Rule (PTAR)—actually restricted program diversity provide ample
165
reason for caution.
These theoretical and empirical debates are rich and hotly
contested; resolving them far exceeds the scope of this Review.
Engaging the literature that explores how structural features affect
media content would offer an account that may be less
straightforward but would provide greater insights into the dynamics
of innovation and technological change as well as provide some
insight into if and when the balance might tip in the other direction.
The measure of any media policy ultimately depends on the nature of
the content that the public receives. One would thus expect an
assessment of these impacts to be part of his proposal. Although Wu
may well be right that the balance tips in favor of openness and
vertical disintegration, without a clearer explanation of how to make
the relevant tradeoffs, readers are left without a clear idea of why that
is the case or the circumstances under which the balance might change
(p 305).
C.

The Role of the Government

Another ambiguity in Wu’s argument is the role of the
government. As a general matter, he is quite critical of government
intervention, noting that corporate interests often enlist the
government’s help when closing down industries (pp 10–11, 145), even
calling the FCC “among the most useful tools of domination [the
broadcast] industry has ever invented” (p 128). He sounds similar
notes when observing that “federal planning is never a good midwife
for a new industry” (p 132). Even worse, “[a]gain and again in the
histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior
arbiter of what is good for the information industries,” with “[t]he
federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s
through the 1960s” being “nothing short of a disgrace” (pp 307–08).
Indeed, he contends that “[g]overnment’s tendency to protect large
market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity” (p 308). Antitrust
litigation was the basis for breaking up AT&T. Yet Wu finds antitrust
inadequate to the task of overseeing information industries (p 303).
165 For more on finsyn, see Schurz Communication v FCC, 982 F2d 1043, 1051 (7th Cir
1992). For more on PTAR, see Thomas Krattenmaker, The Prime Time Access Rules: Six
Commandments for Inept Regulation, 7 Hastings Comm/Ent L J 19, 36–37 (1984). On both, see
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Lucas A. Powe Jr, Regulating Broadcast Programming 72–74,
99–100 (American Enterprise Institute 1994); Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight
of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 Minn L Rev 1415, 1454–58 (1996).
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At other times, however, he is more sanguine about government
involvement. This is perhaps most evident in his call for regulatory
intervention in defense of what he calls the “Separations Principle.” Wu
credits the FCC for a number of policy successes and looks to it to
provide the primary remedies (pp 309–11). Even the discredited antitrust
authorities, Wu says, have an important role to play as a “safeguard
against the FCC’s lapses” (p 312).
Wu draws support for the Separations Principle from certain
traditional frameworks. One is common carriage (pp 57–59, 286,
310–11), which he believes logically extends to all public callings
(pp 58, 286, 303 n *, 311). In so doing, he fails to address a number of
limits that have historically been placed on common carriage. As an
initial matter, the common law duty to provide nondiscriminatory
service applies only to subscribers; it has not been extended to other
166
carriers or other business entities providing complementary services.
At the same time, this argument overlooks the long line of Supreme
Court cases rejecting the extension of common carriage to media
industries on the grounds that doing so would harm free speech rather
167
than help it. Wu must also come to grips with the Supreme Court
precedent discrediting the notion of public callings as a Lochner-era
concept that failed to provide a principled way to distinguish
industries properly subject to common-carriage regulation from those
168
that are not. Despite the efforts of noted scholars to develop a
principled basis for identifying which industries are properly

166 For the leading Supreme Court case decided in the context of railroads, see Memphis &
LRR Co v Southern Express Co (The Express Package Cases), 117 US 1, 27–28 (1886). For
decisions extending this rationale to telephony, see Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co v
Anderson, 196 F 699, 703–05 (ED Wash 1912), citing The Express Package Cases to conclude that
common carrier law did not compel the Interstate Telephone Company to accord the customers
of competing companies the same access to Interstate’s switchboard as Interstate provided to its
own customers. See also generally Huber, et al, Federal Telecommunications Law § 1.3.1 at 13–16
(cited in note 45).
167 For the leading case, see CBS v Democratic National Committee, 412 US 94, 109–11
(1973). For a broader review, see Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as
an Intermediated Experience, 78 Geo Wash L Rev 697, 724–25, 727, 740–41 (2010).
168 The Court noted in Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502, 536 (1934):

It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public
interest . . . . In several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions ‘affected with a
public interest,’ and ‘clothed with a public use,’ have been brought forward as the criteria of
the validity of price control, it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition
and form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation directed at business
practices or prices.
See also Olsen v Western Reference & Bond Association, 313 US 236, 245 (1941), quoting Tyson &
Brother v Banton, 273 US 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes dissenting); Ronald A. Anderson, Government
and Business 225 (South-Western 4th ed 1981) (arguing that Nebbia “destroyed that concept”).
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169

considered affected with the public interest, no coherent conceptual
foundation has emerged. On a more practical level, any invocation of
common carriage must take into account the controversy it has
engendered. Courts, regulators, and commentators have struggled to
implement common-carriage regimes in a coherent manner for more
170
than a century.
At other points, Wu refers to the Separations Principle as “more a
constitutional than a regulatory framework,” although he takes pains
to point out that this observation is not intended to invoke the
principles of the US Constitution (pp 308–09). In fact, Wu advocates
an intervention that would be far more sweeping. Even though
Supreme Court precedent clearly regards the Constitution exclusively
as a limit on state power, not private power, Wu openly calls for
governmental intervention against private power (pp 199, 300–02,
310). Such a position contradicts traditional liberal principles in which
the individual is logically prior to the state as well as the fundamental
liberal commitment (recognized by Wu at p 267) that the coercive
power of the state poses far greater dangers to liberty than private
171
exercises of power ever can. Even those sympathetic to Wu’s policy
recommendations acknowledge that basing them on the Constitution
172
would require nothing short of a revolution in doctrine.
In fact, what Wu suggests is a new constitutional principle is really
an old regulatory one. US policymakers have long experimented with
approaches that require structural separation between the network
and those who would provide services over the network. The FCC
imposed just such a structural separation requirement in its first and
173
second Computer Inquiries. It also underlay the key provision in the
1984 consent decree settling the landmark antitrust case against
169 See, for example, Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 CommLaw Conspectus 67,
109 (2008); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 Fed
Comm L J 225, 228–29 (2002).
170 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher Yoo, Networks in Telecommunications:
Economics and Law 255–56 (Cambridge 2009); Kahn, 1 The Economics of Regulation at 20–94,
325–27 (cited in note 45); Kahn, 2 The Economies of Regulation at 47–94, 325–27 (cited in
note 45).
171 See Christopher S. Yoo, Technologies of Control and the Future of the First Amendment,
53 Wm & Mary L Rev 747, 755–58 (2011).
172 See Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 313–19 (Basic Books 2006) (suggesting that the
traditional judicial focus on state action and away from resolving political questions has created
a powerful inertia not likely to be overcome).
173 See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulation’s (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 FCC2d 384, 388–89 (1980), affd under the name of Computer and
Communications Industry Association v FCC, 693 F2d 198 (DC Cir 1982); Regulatory and Policy
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and
Facilities (First Computer Inquiry), 28 FCC2d 267, 285 (1971), affd in part and revd in part under
the name of GTE Service Corp v FCC, 474 F2d 724 (2d Cir 1973).
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AT&T requiring that the Bell System separate its long-distance,
equipment-manufacturing, and local telephone businesses into
174
separate companies.
Over time, however, policymakers have begun to recognize that
vertical integration often creates important benefits that cannot be
175
realized under a structural separation mandate. Leading examples
include the initial deployment of digital protocols in the core of the
176
telephone network and vertical switching services such as caller ID.
The delays in introducing these services created annual welfare losses
177
in excess of $1 billion. It is for this reason that many scholars have
178
criticized structural separation. It is also the reason that the FCC
179
abolished the requirement in its third Computer Inquiry. Given the
high degree of similarity between these issues, Wu’s proposal might be
expected to explain why the considerations underlying the FCC’s
previous decision to abandon structural separation as too costly do
not still apply.
On the most basic level, however, Wu’s proposal must come to
grips with a more fundamental problem: anyone looking to the
government as a remedy to private power must address the fact that
the same economic characteristics that allow private actors to
dominate markets also allow them to dominate politics as well, a
180
problem that Charles Lindblom called “circularity.” Although Wu
suggests that the Separations Principle is a way to preempt politics
(p 304), more traditional analyses of regulatory behavior raise serious
doubts as to whether politics and technology policy can be rendered
distinct. Indeed, instead of mimicking David versus Goliath, many of
the historical episodes that Wu describes represented a clash of
opposing corporate interests (including a majority of the most recent
ones, such as Apple versus IBM, the AOL–Time Warner merger, and
the modern debate over network neutrality). Wu’s admonition that
174 United States v AT&T, 552 F Supp 131, 196, 223–34 (DDC 1982) (describing the
provisions of the consent decree), affd Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983).
175 Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer
Inquiry), 104 FCC2d 958, 1002–11 ¶¶ 79–97 (1986), affd and modified by 2 FCC Rcd 3035, 3037 ¶ 10
(1987), vacd and remd under the name of California v FCC, 905 F2d 1217, 1238–39 (9th Cir 1990).
176 Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv J L & Tech 1, 24–25 (2005).
177 Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, 1997 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity: Microecon 1, 3, 10, 14–15.
178 See, for example, Robert W. Crandall and J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 Yale J Reg 335, 364–89
(2002); Warren G. Lavey, Ending Structural Separation for Telephone Companies, 18 Conn L
Rev 81, 113 (1985).
179 Third Computer Inquiry, 104 FCC2d at 964 ¶ 3 (cited in 175).
180 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems 201–21
(Basic Books 1977).
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“government’s only proper role is a check on private power, never as
an aid to it” (p 308) provides little guidance when private power is
implicated on both sides of every policy issue. Moreover, past
experience with restrictions on vertical integration has shown that
Wu’s Separations Principle would involve government intervention to
standardize interfaces, mediate disputes over access, and enforce
181
structural separation, interventions that can only be characterized as
182
regulatory rather than constitutional.
D. Normative Assessment of Openness
Another of the book’s signal characteristics is that it generally
discusses openness (particularly with respect to vertical integration) in
laudatory terms (pp 111, 195, 292–93, 305–06). Indeed, the book was
supposed to be named Open until Knopf published Andre Agassi’s
183
autobiography under that title the previous year. At some moments,
however, Wu seems more ambivalent. Open media tends to fragment
rather than unite a nation (pp 214–15). Moguls step in to centralize an
industry when people are unhappy with the quality of content or the
reliability of a service; indeed, the arrival of the centralizing mogul
“heralds a golden age in the life of the new technology” (p 10). In
addition, “the closing is driven by a hunger for quality and scale—the
desire to improve, even perfect the medium and realize its full
potential, which is limited by openness, for all its virtues” (p 78). Wu
credits the new (closed) radio industry for “creating a broad
listenership for quality programming” (p 84). Centralizing innovation
improves coordination and reduces waste (pp 110–11, 306). Wu singles
out for special praise the locked-down vision of computing embodied
in the Apple Macintosh, iPod, iPad, and iPhone, which delivered
unrivaled functionality and a seamless user experience (pp 278, 292).
Indeed, the most casual review of the contemporary economy reveals
a wide range of practices that completely span the spectrum.
In short, the book candidly recognizes that embracing openness
necessarily involves a tradeoff. In so doing, it naturally invites inquiry
into whether conditions exist that might tip the balance the other way.

181

See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 5, 11, 37–39 (cited in note 176).
See Adam Thierer, Thoughts on Wu’s Master Switch, Part 6 (His Audacious Information
Industrial Policy) (Technology Liberation Front Nov 2, 2010), online at http://techliberation.com/
2010/11/02/thoughts-on-wu’s-master-switch-part-6-his-audacious-information-industrial-policy
(visited Aug 19, 2011) (suggesting that enforcement of these interventions through unelected
bureaucrats like the FCC would undercut any benefit to a constitutional approach).
183 See Jennifer 8 Lee, Got Galley of The Master Switch by Tim Wu. Original Name Was
Open, Then Andre Agassi Took It (July 21, 2010), online at http://j8.ly/got-galley-of-the-masterswitch-by-tim-wu-ori (visited Apr 29, 2011).
182
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Fortunately, the scholarly literature on standardization and modularity
has advanced analytical frameworks that can provide some traction on
184
this question. Consider first the theory of optimal standardization.
Standardization is largely a function of the heterogeneity of consumer
preferences. If everyone wants the same thing, one can satisfy all of
their preferences with a single network optimized in the way that
everyone wants. As what people want becomes more diverse, one
would naturally expect the services that the network is offering to
185
become more diverse in response. If that is the case, shifts away from
the way the current network is designed may represent nothing more
than the network’s attempt to evolve to meet consumer demand.
From this perspective, experiments with new standards should be
regarded not necessarily as anticompetitive but as a potential sign of a
186
healthy environment for innovation. Indeed, if demand is sufficiently
heterogeneous, firms generally avoid me-too strategies, preferring to
pursue approaches that distinguish them from their competitors.
When this is the case, industries are more likely to reflect a mix of
business strategies rather than uniform tactics. Thus, the fact that one
firm has adopted an open architecture may make it more likely that at
187
least some of its competitors will adopt a closed one.
188
Further insights emerge from modularity theory, which suggests
that modular architectures are not appropriate if the tasks constituting
189
the overall process exhibit too many interdependencies. In addition,
changes in the technological environment may cause a previously
190
modular architecture to break down. A growing number of theorists
have recognized that the Internet’s layered architecture establishes a
form of modularity that allows each actor to optimize its own
184

See Yoo, 19 Harv J L & Tech at 34–37 (cited in note 176).
See Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization and Variety, 20 Econ Letters 71,
71–74 (1986).
186 See Shane Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial
Internet, 8 J Telecomm & High Tech L 25, 26 (2009).
187 See Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 Fed Comm L J 67,
89 (2010).
188 See Christopher S. Yoo, Layering, Modularity Theory, and Internet Policy *48–50
(forthcoming 2012) (on file with authors).
189 See Michael E. Raynor and Clayton M. Christensen, Integrate to Innovate *16–19
(Deloitte Research 2002), online at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-SouthAfrica/Local
%20Assets/Documents/I2I(1).pdf (visited Aug 19, 2011). See also Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do
Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indust &
Corp Change 155, 180–86 (2008); Chesbrough and Teece, 74 Harv Bus Rev at 65, 70 (cited in
note 116).
190 See Baldwin, 17 Indust & Corp Change at 180 (cited in note 189); Chesbrough and
Teece, 74 Harv Bus Rev at 68 (cited in note 116); Michael G. Jacobides and Sidney G. Winter,
The Co-evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of
Production, 26 Strategic Mgmt J 395, 405 (2005).
185
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behavior locally. The problem is that when these individually rational
decisions combine and interact with one another, they can lead to
191
aggregate behavior that is suboptimal.
Rather than extolling the virtues of open architectures in the
abstract, these frameworks provide a basis for a better understanding
of both the benefits of open architectures and their limitations.
Although not as simple and straightforward as the view of openness
embodied in the Cycle, the additional nuance adds power to the analysis
and makes it more likely that any decisions will reflect good policy.
E.

The (In)evitability of the Cycle

The Master Switch provides a different perspective on the frequent
debates among innovation scholars over whether technological
progress primarily results from “demand pull” or “technology push.”
Instead, Wu offers a more charismatic vision in which corporate moguls
are the primary movers of technological change (pp 14, 29). Despite the
personality-driven nature of this change model, Wu frequently speaks
of the Cycle as if it is unavoidable, describing it as some inexorable
force (pp 7, 252). At other times, however, Wu concedes that the Cycle
is not inevitable (pp 85, 156). Sometimes industries skip the initial open
phase, as occurred with television (p 154). Corporate moguls seeking to
assert control over an industry sometimes fail, as happened in AOL’s
acquisition of Time Warner (pp 264–68), and sometimes promote
openness, as Ted Turner did with respect to cable television (pp 208–11).
Like Wu’s other exceptions to the simple version of the Cycle,
these deviations invite further analysis. If the forces opening and
closing industries are supposed to be inexorable, policy analysts
should be very interested to determine what caused the industry to
deviate from the expected pattern. Acknowledging the possibility of
variations also has major implications for Wu’s policy
recommendations, because it is the supposed relentlessness of the
Cycle that provides the primary impetus for taking action to forestall
the outcome that Wu fears.
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that openness has its
charismatic figures as well. Although Wu describes Ted Turner’s role in
turning cable into a viable alternative to broadcast television, many
other figures go unmentioned. Many of the greatest successes of the
open-source movement were pushed by strong central figures, such as
191 See Jon Crowcroft, et al, Is Layering Harmful?, 6 IEEE Network 20, 23–24 (Jan 1992);
Randy Bush and David Meyer, Some Internet Architectural Guidelines and Philosophy *7–8
(IETF Network Working Group, Request for Comments 3439, Dec 2002), online at
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3439 (visited Aug 19, 2011).
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Richard Stallman. The account of Google does not even mention
Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page, an omission particularly
interesting in light of Page’s reemergence as the head of Google
following the book’s publication. Even the Internet protocol suite,
Wu’s archetype for the ideal open architecture, was greatly influenced
by Vint Cerf’s steady and visionary guidance, although he too is
downplayed in Wu’s narrative. Clearly, bold leadership was not the
exclusive province of the established corporate interests.
Any claims about the continuing dominance of incumbents must
also be viewed in light of how frequently and quickly the leading
players in the technology player have changed. In the 1980s, the
companies regarded as dominant included IBM and AT&T (as a longdistance company). Although both continue to exist, neither is as
influential as during the 1980s, and neither is currently regarded as a
market leader. During the 1990s, AOL was a dominant industry force,
and now it is struggling to remain relevant. The other behemoths of
the 1990s, Microsoft and Intel, now face vibrant competition from
Google, who in turn is facing challenges from the next generation of
192
upstarts, led by Facebook and Netflix.
A deeper look at the history reveals the limitations of focusing
only on broad patterns to the exclusion of the detail that inevitably
accompanies any industry. Rather than focusing on a single, abstract
pattern, policymakers would be better served by trying to understand
the complex forces driving innovation and technological change. Only
then can we understand the dynamics of the various industry cycles
and how best to address them.
CONCLUSION
The great American architect Daniel Burnham is reported to
have said, “Make no little plans. They have no magic to stir men’s
193
blood.” In his own field, Tim Wu has taken this advice to heart. In
attempting to discover a general pattern that describes the path along
which every technology must inevitably travel, he has authored a book
with grand ambitions. If successful, his efforts to distill from four
disparate communications industries a single, unified pattern of
technological and business practices would be a major accomplishment.
The more general the result, the more powerful the analysis becomes.
192 On the growing competition between Google and Facebook, see Adrian Ron, Google
and Facebook Are Fighting for Our Lives, Daily Telegraph Blog (May 13, 2011), online at
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/adrianhon/100006687/google-and-facebook-are-fightingfor-our-lives/ (visited Aug 19, 2011). On Google’s recent efforts to compete with Netflix, see
YouTube Adding 3,000 More Films, Boston Globe Bus 6 (May 10, 2011).
193 Charles Moore, 2 Daniel H. Burnham: Architect, Planner of Cities 147 (Da Capo 1968).
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The breadth of the book’s vision is thus one of its greatest
strengths. At the same time, however, it presents some of its greatest
challenges. History is notoriously untidy, and all too often real-world
facts stubbornly refuse to conform to what would otherwise be a
terrific story.
Rather than trying to fit all of these industries into a single
Procrustean pattern, a more detailed assessment of the history might
suggest replacing a model that is deterministic and general with one
that is more nuanced and contingent. This approach would search for
the many evolutionary paths that an industry might follow as well as a
better understanding of the factors that cause industries to fall into
one pattern or the other. The fact that The Master Switch is aimed at a
general audience instead of at academics partially justifies the
simplified presentation of the episodes discussed in the book. That
said, the book is based almost entirely on a historical claim, so the
force of its policy recommendations depends entirely on the accuracy
and completeness of its treatment of the historical record.
A more measured and nuanced approach would lead to policy
implications that are less sweeping and categorical, and thus less likely
to yield the simple policy inferences that policymakers and policy
advocates seek. That said, adding complexity can produce a theory
that more accurately describes real-world outcomes and thus can
provide a better foundation for sound public policy.

